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 Executive Summary 
 
The European Union has approximately 85001 industrial sites that are considered 
to present major hazards due to the potential accident risk associated with the 
presence of dangerous substances as defined by the Seveso II Directive2.  
Approximately, half of these sites are classified as so-called lower tier sites 
because the quantity of the dangerous substances exceeds the lower threshold 
quantity stipulated in the Directive.  Theoretically, the Seveso II Directive 
imposes a lower regulatory burden on lower tier sites than upper tier sites, whose 
quantity of dangerous substances exceeds the higher threshold quantity given in 
the Directive.  This lower burden is manifested particularly in Article 7, designed 
to apply exclusively to lower tier sites. In 2008-2009, on behalf of the Committee 
of Seveso Competent Authorities (CCA), the European Commission’s Joint 
Research Centre (JRC) undertook a study of Seveso implementation in lower tier 
sites, through administration of a survey of competent authorities and 
subsequently co-organization of a seminar on the topic with DG-Environment and 
the Czech Republic, which took place in Prague on 22 April 2009.  This paper 
summarises the results of this study.    
The regulatory burden imposed by the Directive on lower tier sites (“LT sites”) is 
intended to be less than that imposed on upper tier sites (“UT sites”) on the basis 
that they generally represent a lower hazard (although not in all cases, a point 
discussed later in this paper).   Most notably, in lieu of a safety report, Article 7 of 
the Directive requires LT sites to develop a Major Accident Prevention Policy 
(MAPP).  Lower tier sites are exempt from the Article 9 obligation to produce a 
safety report and demonstrate the existence of a safety management system.  
Lower tier sites are also exempt from obligations imposed by Article 11 and 13 
(see Table 1 on p. 1).  Annex III of the Directive also introduces the 
“proportionality principle” such that “The requirements laid down in the 
document referred to in Article 7 should be proportionate to the major-accident 
hazards presented by the establishment”.    
The MAPP Requirement 
The requirement of a MAPP is built on the model established by the international 
standard community and that had already been applied to management systems 
for controlling risks to environment health and safety.  As shown in Figure 2 (next 
page) policy is only one part of a management system.  For example, the major 
requirements of an environmental management system under ISO 14001 include a 
policy statement that describes the company’s commitments to prevent pollution, 
to continually improve the environmental management system, and to comply 
with all applicable statutory and regulatory requirements.   
 
                                                 
1 According to Commission data as at March 2009 
2 Currently defined as substances with specific toxic, flammable, explosive and other reactive 
properties in accordance with Council Directive 67/548/EEC of 27 June 1967 on the 
approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the classification, 
packaging and labelling of dangerous substances, and Directive 1999/45/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 1999 concerning the approximation of laws, regulations 
and administrative provisions of the Member States relating to the classification, packaging and 
labelling of dangerous preparations. 
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 According to the Seveso II Directive, lower tier sites are only explicitly 
responsible for establishing the policy part of the Safety Management System 
(SMS), which is the MAPP.   Annex III indicates that implementation of the 
remainder of the SMS “should be proportionate to the major-accident hazards 
presented by the establishment”.  This approach allowed simplification of SMS 
requirements on lower tier sites on an individual site basis in relation to the hazard.  
Member States, being responsible for implementation, were charged with 
deciding how to judge compliance of lower tier sites with this obligation in 
practice. 
The European Commission Study of Article 7 Implementation 
Despite early efforts to clarify the obligations established in Article 7, it appears 
that ten years since the Directive's effective entry into force many Member States 
appear to be still struggling with questions about its interpretation and practical 
application.  To foster further dialogue on this topic, the European Commission 
proposed to conduct a review of how Member States implemented the Article 7 
requirement.   
The study of Article 7 implementation consisted of two parts: a survey of Article 
7 requirements in EU/EEA/EFTA countries followed by a CCA seminar to 
discuss the findings with Member States and examine particular cases more 
closely.  The goals of the study was to obtain a general overview of Article 7 
implementation across Europe, including strengths and weaknesses of 
implementation and examples of good practice.  It intended to achieve this goal 
by collecting and analysing the following types of information from each Seveso 
country: 
1. The economic character and hazard profile of its lower tier sites 
2. Formal requirements and implementation practices established in the country 
to oversee and enforce Article 7  
3. A perspective on challenges and limitations and strengths and weaknesses 
associated with Article 7 implementation 
4. A library of examples of alternative practices, tools and guidance for 
implementing Article 7 
5. Recommendations for EU level initiatives that might facilitate greater 
enforceability, consistency and effectiveness of Seveso implementation in 
lower tier sites across the EU Member States. 
The survey was distributed to CCA Member and Observer (EEA/EFTA) and 
observer countries in December 2008 and its results were presented in the follow-
up seminar in April 2009.   
Conclusions from the Survey 
The survey responses produced several important insights in regard to the 
character of lower tier sites, and requirements and practices associated with 
implementation of Article 7 in the Member States and EEA countries.  Countries 
were also able to express their opinion about the usefulness of Article 7 
requirements and particular challenges as well as benefits linked with this 
provision and with the way in which it is implemented in their country in 
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 particular.  Survey results also  provided a perspective on how Switzerland, an 
EFTA country, adjusted the regulatory burden for lower risk sites.   
The following points highlight the most important findings: 
• A considerable portion of lower tier sites are a significant challenge for 
Seveso implementation because of limited resources and risk management 
capacity.   
• Residual risk and location are factors that can make lower tier sites a higher 
risk than upper tier sites.   
• Challenges associated with certain Seveso site profiles are not limited 
to lower tier sites.   
• Many countries have defined a specific legal requirements associated with 
Article 7 in more detail than the Directive.    
• More than half of the countries impose a legal obligation, or equivalent, on 
lower tier sites to implement an SMS.  Moreover, even when there is no 
specific legal requirement, the enforcement practices of many countries make 
an SMS a de facto requirement for lower tier sites.   
• Countries are more or less split in terms of whether they define the MAPP as a 
reduced SMS or as a reduced safety report.   
• Not all countries systematically require a risk assessment.  Countries that 
identified the MAPP with safety report requirements also tended to expect the 
MAPP to include a risk assessment. 
• The type of content that constitutes the MAPP proper (without annexes) varies 
considerably from country to country, causing considerable variation in the 
length of the document from country to country.   
• Most of the countries used the MAPP for enforcement and nearly all felt that 
the MAPP was also useful for the operators.   
• Many countries routinely assess the quality of the MAPP, although an exact 
proportion of countries applying this practice could not be derived from 
responses.   
• Many countries did not use the same criteria for evaluating MAPPs in lower 
sites as used to evaluate the safety report in upper tier sites.   
• Countries are more inclined to apply a similar approach to evaluating the SMS 
on lower as for upper tier sites.. 
 
The Seminar on Major Accident Prevention in Lower Tier Seveso 
Establishments 
This one-day seminar was co-hosted by the European Commission and the Czech 
Ministry of Environment as a follow-up to the survey.  It took place on 22 April 
2009 in Prague, Czech Republic, coinciding with a meeting of the Committee of 
Seveso Competent Authorities.  Around 80 people attended the seminar, mainly 
from Seveso competent authorities.  Almost all Member States, Candidate 
Countries, EEA and EFTA countries were represented.   
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 The agenda (see Annex 4) consisted of a presentation on the survey findings and 
presentations by industry and various countries (both Member States and 
countries outside the EU) aimed to provide a perspective on regulatory 
arrangements to establish effective risk management on lower hazard sites 
(classified as “lower tier sites” within the Seveso regime).  These presentations 
were followed by group discussions intended to identify common points of 
interest and recommendations for regulatory policy and implementation. 
Industry and Country Presentations 
The five presentations were as follows: 
1. Seveso Impacts - Article 7 - Lower Tier sites by Douglas Leech, FECC - 
European Association of Chemical Distributors/CBA Chemical Business 
Association 
2. Implementation of Lower Tier Site Requirements in the Czech Republic, by 
Stanislav Malý, 
 Occupation
al Safety Research Institute, Czech Republic  
3. Implementation of Lower Tier Site Requirements in Italy, Andrea Santucci, 
Ministry of Environment, Italy 
4. Addressing Low Thresholds in Switzerland, Bernard Gay, Federal Office 
for Environment (FOEN), Switzerland 
5. Korean Experience of Process Safety Management Systems in the Chemical 
Industry.  Hyuckmyun Kwon, Occupational Safety and Health Agency 
(KOSHA), Korea 
Highlights from each presentation are presented in the paragraphs below.  The 
agenda of the seminar is available in Annex 4. 
 
Conclusions from the Seminar 
The findings from the seminar largely reflected the findings of the survey and 
there was no evidence of any contradiction between the results of these two 
efforts.  In fact, the seminar confirmed many observations on advantages and 
disadvantages of Article 7 requirements noted by survey respondents.  Therefore, 
in summarizing seminar conclusions, only those findings are mentioned that offer 
additional insights. 
• Lower tier site status can remain a disproportionately heavy burden for small 
business but it is often difficult for authorities to find effective solutions to 
make the burden lighter.   
• Additional complexity, and therefore, burden may be created for lower tier 
sites when more than one authority is closely involved in enforcement.   
• Several participants noted the importance of having an adequate risk 
assessment from lower tier sites for emergency and land-use planning.  
Nonetheless, the demands on resources and expertise associated with risk 
assessment can make this task challenging for some lower tier sites.   
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 • Both Switzerland and Korea presented alternative practices and useful 
experience in regard to applying a proportionate approach to lower hazard 
sites.   
• Participants acknowledged that there was a particular lack of coherence 
between the definition of the MAPP and the SMS.  In particular, countries 
evidenced substantial differences in regard to their interpretation of the MAPP.   
• There was a common desire among competent authority representatives to 
foster greater consistency in applying Article 7 requirements to lower tier sites 
across the EU.   
 
Recommendations Resulting from the European Commission Study 
Although several countries and workshop participants made recommendations on 
how implementation of Article 7 could be improved, no consensus emerged on 
any specific recommendation.  The study itself confirmed that exchange of 
practices among Seveso implementing countries was a first step in providing a 
common understanding of certain provisions of the Directive.  The study also 
confirmed that flexibility and proportionality were important to achieving the 
objectives of the Directive in local contexts.  However, meeting these objectives 
is sometimes an impediment to consistency and clarity of the basic Seveso 
requirements.  Given these results, the European Commission undertook to fulfil a 
more general recommendation to examine the lower tier provisions of the current 
Directive in the review of the Directive  It would also review how the 
implementation could be improved, for example by facilitating indirect activities, 
such as mutual exchanges and joint development of technical guidance and tools, 
that could lead to greater clarity and consistency.  The findings and observations 
from the study and the seminar would be taken into account in this review process.  
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 Introduction 
The European Union has approximately 85003 industrial sites that are considered 
to present major hazards due to the potential accident risk associated with the 
presence of dangerous substances as defined by the Seveso II Directive4.  
Approximately, half of these sites are classified as so-called lower tier sites 
because the quantity of the dangerous substances exceeds the lower threshold 
quantity stipulated in the Directive.  Theoretically, the Seveso II Directive 
imposes a lower regulatory burden on lower tier sites than upper tier sites, whose 
quantity of dangerous substances exceeds the higher threshold quantity given in 
the Directive.  This lower burden is manifested particularly in Article 7, designed 
to apply exclusively to lower tier sites. In 2008-2009, on behalf of the Committee 
of Seveso Competent Authorities (CCA), the European Commission’s Joint 
Research Centre (JRC) undertook a study of Seveso implementation in lower tier 
sites, through administration of a survey of competent authorities and 
subsequently co-organization of a seminar on the topic with DG-Environment and 
the Czech Republic, which took place in Prague on 22 April 2009.  This paper 
summarises the results of this study.    
Proportionality and Application of the Seveso Directive to Lower Tier Sites 
The proportionality principle forms one of the philosophical pillars of the Seveso 
II  approach.5  In various parts of the legislative framework there are 
opportunities to reduce or increase the regulatory burden so that is more or less in 
proportion to the overall level of risk present on the site. This principle als
reinforces application o
the EU  subsidiarity 
principle because it 
generally requires tha
detailed as
implementation are left 
to local actors.   
o 
f 
t 
pects of 
ed 
 
r 
                                                
Table 1:  Seveso II Obligations Allocated on the 
Basis of Upper or Lower Tier Status 
In particular, the 
proportionality 
principle is embedd
in the definition of the 
scope of the Directive. 
Sites are classified as 
Article 9 (higher) o
lower hazard according to the quantity of a certain substance or category of 
substance.  The Directive refers to these as “Article 9” and “Article 6 and 7” 
respectively, but they are more commonly referred to as “upper tier” and “lower 
Seveso II Article Dutyholder 
Article 7: Major Accident 
Prevention Policy 
Lower Tier Sites Only 
Article 9:  Safety Report and 
Safety Management System 
(including a Major Accident 
Prevention Policy) 
Upper Tier Sites Only 
Article 11: Internal and External 
Emergency Plans 
Upper Tier Sites Only 
Article 13:  Information to the 
Public 
Upper Tier Sites Only 
Article 18: Inspections Once per year for Upper Tier 
sites unless a systematic 
appraisal is applied. 
 
 
3 According to Commission data as at March 2009 
4 Currently defined as substances with specific toxic, flammable, explosive and other reactive 
properties in accordance with Council Directive 67/548/EEC of 27 June 1967 on the 
approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the classification, 
packaging and labelling of dangerous substances, and Directive 1999/45/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 1999 concerning the approximation of laws, regulations 
and administrative provisions of the Member States relating to the classification, packaging and 
labelling of dangerous preparations. 
5 The principle of proportionality is a political maxim which states that no layer of government 
should take any action that exceeds that which is necessary to achieve the objective of government. 
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 tier”.  Within the European Union, th
lower tier sites generally constitute arou
50% of all Seveso sites, and if EEA-EFTA
countries are included, the number 
amounts to more or less 4500 sites in 
Seveso implementing countrie
Figure 1:  Text of Article 7 of the 
Seveso II Directive 
Major-accident prevention policy 
1. Member States shall require the 
operator to draw up a document setting 
out his major-accident prevention policy 
and to ensure that it is properly 
implemented. The major-accident 
prevention policy established by the 
operator shall be designed to guarantee a 
high level of protection for man and the 
environment by appropriate means, 
structures and management systems. 
1a. For establishments which 
subsequently fall within the scope of this 
Directive, the document referred to in 
paragraph 1 shall be drawn up without 
delay, but at all events within three 
months after the date on which this 
Directive applies to the establishment 
concerned, as laid down in the first 
subparagraph of Article 2(1). 
2. The document must take account of 
the principles contained in Annex III and 
be made available to the competent 
authorities for the purposes of, amongst 
other things, implementation of Articles 
5 (2) and 18.  
3. This Article shall not apply to the 
establishments referred to in Article 9. 
e 
nd 
 
s and 
is 
sis 
int 
ticle 7 
e 
 
ex III of 
 
ument 
ablishment”.    
l 
xt 
 
n, 
em, and to comply 
, it 
be still struggling with questions about its interpretation 
and practical application 
                                                
Switzerland6.   
The regulatory burden imposed by the 
Directive on lower tier sites (“LT sites”) 
intended to be less than that imposed on 
upper tier sites (“UT sites”) on the ba
that they generally represent a lower 
hazard (although not in all cases, a po
discussed later in this paper).   Most 
notably, in lieu of a safety report, Ar
of the Directive requires LT sites to 
develop a Major Accident Prevention 
Policy (MAPP).  Lower tier sites are 
exempt from the Article 9 obligation to 
produce a safety report and demonstrat
the existence of a safety management 
system.  Lower tier sites are also exempt
from obligations imposed by Article 11 
and 13 (see Table 1 on p. 1).  Ann
the Directive also introduces the 
“proportionality principle” such that “The
requirements laid down in the doc
referred to in Article 7 should be 
proportionate to the major-accident 
hazards presented by the est
The MAPP Requirement 
The requirement of a MAPP is built on the model established by the internationa
standard community and that had already been applied to management systems 
for controlling risks to environment health and safety.  As shown in Figure 2 (ne
page) policy is only one part of a management system.  For example, the major 
requirements of an environmental management system under ISO 14001 include a
policy statement that describes the company’s commitments to prevent pollutio
to continually improve the environmental management syst
with all applicable statutory and regulatory requirements.   
Despite these early efforts to clarify the obligations established in Article 7
appears that ten years since the Directive's effective entry into force many 
Member States appear to 
 
6 By agreement the European Economic Area countries (Iceland, Lichtenstein and Norway) also 
enact EU environmental legislation including the Seveso II Directive.  Switzerland is a member of 
the European Free Trade Zone (EFTA) and enacts legislation whose provisions are generally 
considered equivalent to those imposed by Seveso. 
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 According to the Seveso II Directive, lower tier sites are only explicitly 
responsible for establishing the policy part of the Safety Management System 
(SMS), which is the MAPP.   Annex III indicates that implementation of the 
remainder of the SMS “should be proportionate to the major-accident hazards 
presented by the establishment”.  This approach allowed simplification of SMS 
requirements on lower tier sites on an individual site basis in relation to the hazard.  
Member States, being responsible for implementation, were charged with 
deciding how to judge compliance of lower tier sites with this obligation in 
practice. 
Management 
Review Policy 
Checking 
Implementation 
and Operation 
Planning 
Figure 2:  A Typical Management System Structure 
In their paper describing the new Directive in 1999, Porter and Wettig elaborated 
on the significance of Article 7 requirements: 
“[The MAPP requirement] has been derived from an increased 
recognition that appropriate policies and management systems within a 
company are necessary to safeguard against major accidents, as seen 
from the fact that ‘management factors’ have contributed to many of 
the accidents which have occurred since the implementation of Seveso 
I. 
The MAPP must be established in writing and should include the 
Operator’s overall aims and principles of action with respect to the 
prevention and control of major-accident hazards … “ [1] 
The EU Guidance on Seveso Safety Management Systems explains the burden 
imposed on lower tier sites this way: 
“…the requirements for policies and management systems which apply 
to a lower tier establishment are similar to those for an upper tier 
establishment except that: 
 the Directive states that the requirements should be proportionate 
to the major-accident hazards presented by the establishment, 
which is considered to introduce more flexibility; 
 it is not necessary to prepare a detailed report for demonstrating 
how the Safety Management System has been put into effect; 
 the document setting out the MAPP must be ‘made available’ but 
need not necessarily be sent to the competent authorities.” [2] 
Recurring Questions about Interpretation of Article 7 Requirements 
Despite these early efforts to clarify the obligations established in Article 7, it 
appears that ten years since the Directive's effective entry into force many 
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 Member States still appear to be struggling with questions about its interpretation 
and practical application. EU level efforts to clarify Seveso obligations have 
largely focused on requirements of upper tier sites, notably the safety report and 
safety management systems.  Similarly, researchers analysing Seveso from an 
enforcement or implementation perspective have targeted safety reports and 
safety management systems on upper tier sites, for example, in studies performed 
by Versluis [3], Brazier and Waite [4], and DiMichaela et al. [5] .  There has been 
little written subsequent to the Directive’s entry into force on how Article 7 is 
implemented in practice and whether it has been effective in both fostering 
effective risk management on lower hazard sites without imposing an 
unnecessarily heavy regulatory burden. 
Nonetheless, exchanges among Seveso inspectors such as those through the 
Mutual Joint Visit programme for Seveso Inspections have often included 
discussions about application of the MAPP requirement.  Some recurring 
questions asked by Seveso inspectors include:  
 What does a “major accident prevention policy” look like in other EU 
countries? 
 What did the Seveso II authors intend by a MAPP?  
 How do authorities use the MAPP to enforce compliance on lower tier 
sites?   
 Can authorities use the MAPP to drive safety on lower tier sites and if so, 
how?   
 How detailed should MAPPs be in describing components of Annex III, that 
is, the safety management system?   
 What is the difference between a MAPP and a safety management system?   
 How is the MAPP different from a safety report?    
 What inspection tools and practices have been developed and applied to 
enforce Article 7 requirements?   
The Seveso Inspection Series report on Necessary Measures for Preventing Major 
Accidents at Petroleum Storage Depots [6] is one of the few publications to 
document the perplexity shared by many competent authorities surrounding the 
MAPP requirement.   
“Several participants considered the [MAPP] requirement important and 
appropriate for lower-tier establishments. Other participants were less 
convinced that the MAPP requirement was meaningful in safety terms. In 
particular, these participants did not feel that the difference between a 
MAPP and an SMS was very clear, mainly because (in their opinion) the 
Directive itself does not define the MAPP very well.  
Participants differed considerable in their opinions concerning the contents, 
the size and even the necessity of a MAPP (despite the obligation in the 
Directive). Moreover, there was not full agreement on what should be the 
content of a MAPP … 
… In the discussions representatives of some countries reported that they 
have implemented a stricter interpretation of the MAPP obligation:” 
14 
 In 2008 the European Commission launched a series of initiatives to solicit 
stakeholder opinions on effectiveness of the Directive and pinpoint potential 
improvements.7   Comments on lower tier site requirements obtained across these 
channels gave reason to suspect a high level of inconsistency in their application 
among the Member States.  Moreover, the cause of this predicament was by and 
large assigned to the vagueness of the Directive (and supporting guidance) on 
lower tier site requirements, particularly the definition of the MAPP and SMS (in 
general).  At the CCA Seminar on Enforceability in 2008 one workgroup 
identified “poor guidance on MAPP and SMS” as a weakness in current 
implementation [7].  Another work group recommended clarification between the 
MAPP, the safety report and safety management systems and also on how the 
proportionality principle should function.  A few participants even questioned the 
validity of the Seveso division of upper and lower tier as a mechanism for 
concentrating more resources on higher risk establishments, proposing that 
perhaps there was really little significant difference in the burden associated with 
requirements imposed on upper vs. lower tier in many Member States.  (This 
premise was subsequently refuted by the results of the survey on implementation 
of Article 7 on lower tier sites in Seveso implementing countries and 
Switzerland.) 
In the F-Seveso Study of Effectiveness of the Seveso II Directive some industry 
respondents expressed doubts about the significance of differentiating obligations 
imposed on lower vs. upper tier sites. 
“For a handful of operators there are still no clear differences between 
the level of requirements for upper and lower tier Seveso 
establishments.  In their view the proportionality principle needs to be 
implemented with harmonized criteria to be defined.  They 
recommend developing guidance documents define the principle of 
proportionality, with concrete examples of implementation.” [8] 
There was also open speculation about the possibility of formally introducing new 
obligations for lower tier sites. 
“The two tier approach, implementing the proportionality principle, is 
recognized as appropriate, even if some adjustments could be proposed 
to require certain effective aspects of the Seveso II Directive [to] be 
applied not only to upper tier but also to lower tier establishments, like 
the preparation of the safety report with identification of major 
accident scenarios, and the implementation of a formal safety 
management system.” [8] 
In the light of this collection of comments, the European Commission became 
interested in gaining more precise knowledge about the application of lower tier 
site requirements in Seveso implementing countries.  Over the course of 2008-
2009 it embarked on a two-part initiative to identify and compare different 
                                                 
7 The European Commission was planning to propose a modification to the  Seveso Directive to 
align the substance criteria with the new CLP-Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 that adapts previous 
EU legislation on classification, labelling and packaging of chemicals to the GHS (Globally 
Harmonised System of Classification and Labelling of Chemicals)).  This circumstance was seen 
as an opportunity to undertake a review of the effectiveness of the Directive more generally to 
assess whether other modifications to clarify and update requirements of the Directive should be 
introduced. 
15 
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practices in the Seveso implementing countries, and identify common challenges 
and opportunities for improvement. 
Major Accidents on Lower Tier Sites 
A study of major accidents reported to the European Commission’s Major 
Accident Reporting System (MARS) database by the EU-158 from 1999 to 2008 
shows 5 times more major accidents on upper tier sites have been reported than on 
lower tier sites (Figure 3 on this page).  (This measure of difference assumes that 
the ratio of upper tier to 
lower tier in the EU 
remained roughly 1:1 
across the years as it is 
currently. ) While in 
earlier years there are 
many accidents whose 
Seveso tier status is 
unknown, the annual 
summary by tier (Figure 
4 on the next page) 
indicates that in later 
years, when tier status 
has been identified 
more consistently for 
plants involved in 
accidents, the difference 
between numbers of accidents on lower vs. upper tier sites is even more striking.  
In 2005 and 20069, for which most of the sites are identified by tier status, and 
there is at least 15 times the number of accidents on upper tier vs. lower tier sites.  
(Reporting process for years 2007 – 2008 is still not complete.) In addition, the 
number of fatal accidents reported for lower tier sites (6) during this period is 
about one quarter of those reported for upper tier sites (26) as shown in Figure 5 
(on the next page).10  These accident reports recorded 30 deaths for lower tier 
accidents and 553 injuries vs. 34 deaths and 72 injuries over the same period for 
upper tier sites (see Figure 6 on the next page).  The lower tier figures are largely 
Figure 3:  Number of Accidents Reported to MARS 
(EU-15) by Seveso Tier Status – 1999 - 2008 
 
8 The EU-15 consists of the 15 Member States that formed the European Union when the Seveso 
II Directive became effective in 1999.   In 2004 and 2007 12 additional Member States were 
admitted to the European Union.  For most new Member States,  the effective implementation of  
notification and accident reporting process did not start until at least a year following accession 
into the EU. 
9 In 2005 it became mandatory for Member States to identify their Seveso sites to the Commission  
in the Seveso Plants Retrieval Information System (SPIRS) in accordance with the 2003 
amendment to the Directive. 
10 The tendency to over-report environmental consequences in early years makes it difficult to 
provide a similar comparison of differences between accidents on upper vs. lower tier sites relative 
to their impact on the environment without analysing each accident report individually. (In fact, 
until 2006, every accident report indicates some sort of “suspected” environmental damage.) A 
more in-depth analysis of consequences was not intended as part of the current study.    
 
  
Figure 4  Annual Frequency of MARS Accidents by 
Seveso Tier Status 1999 - 2008  
 
Figure 5:  Number of Fatal Accidents Reported to MAHB 
(1999 – 2008) 
 
Figure 6:  Total Fatalities and Injuries for Major Accidents Reported to 
MARS (1999 – 2008) by Seveso Tier Status 
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dominated by the explosion at a fireworks storage facility in the Dutch city of 
Enschede on 13 May 2000 that claimed 22 lives and  injured 540 people.11 
The European Commission Study of Article 7 Implementation 
The study of Article 7 implementation consisted of two parts: a survey of Article 
7 requirements in EU/EEA/EFTA countries followed by a CCA seminar to 
discuss the findings with Member States and examine particular cases more 
closely.  The goals of the study was to obtain a general overview of Article 7 
implementation across Europe, including strengths and weaknesses of 
implementation and examples of good practice.  It intended to achieve this goal 
by collecting and analysing the following types of information from each Seveso 
country: 
The economic character and hazard profile of its lower tier sites 
1. Formal requirements and implementation practices established in the country 
to oversee and enforce Article 7  
2. A perspective on challenges and limitations and strengths and weaknesses 
associated with Article 7 implementation 
3. A library of examples of alternative practices, tools and guidance for 
implementing Article 7 
4. Recommendations for EU level initiatives that might facilitate greater 
enforceability, consistency and effectiveness of Seveso implementation in 
lower tier sites across the EU Member States. 
The survey was distributed to CCA Member and Observer (EEA/EFTA) and 
observer countries in December 2008 and its results were presented in the follow-
up seminar in April 2009.   
Part 1.  Survey Description and Findings 
The survey consisted of 11 questions aimed to obtain an overview of country 
practices and experiences related to implementation and enforcement of the Major 
Accident Prevention Policy and minimum requirements for Safety Management 
Systems at these sites.  It also sought to gain a rough perspective on the type of 
industrial sectors represented by lower tier sites and the size of these enterprises 
and whether these or other characteristics influenced lower tier site compliance. 
Annex 1 of this document contains a copy of the survey.
                                                 
11 The 2003 amendment to the Directive assigned new criteria to the Explosives categories 
covered by the Directive.  It is generally thought that the Enschede site would have been classified 
as an upper tier site using the criteria effective today. 
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 The response rate to the survey was very high.  Out of 30 countries solicited, 27 
(90%) responded to the survey.  As shown in Figure 7 at left, respondents 
included 24 Member States and 3 
EEA/EFTA countries.12   Figure 7:  EU Status of Country 
Respondents 
Moreover, the response quality also 
appeared to be very high.  Most 
countries completed all the questions 
and provided a detailed commentary 
to support their answers.  
Respondent countries also were quite
diligent in representing the diversity 
of practices in different regions (
just the perspective at national level)
which in some cases took 
conside
 
not 
 
rable effort.  
 
Profile of Lower Tier Sites in Respondent Countries 
The first four questions aimed to solicit data or impressions regarding the number 
and economic character of lower tier sites in each respondent country.  The survey 
allowed respondents the option of providing best estimates in lieu of precise 
statistical data.   This approach was necessary because economic studies do not 
analyse lower tier sites as a separate class of enterprise and therefore, a precise 
assessment of their economic character by country, or indeed as a whole, is not 
readily available.  Moreover, an exact reckoning, even when some data are 
available, can be a bureaucratic and time-consuming exercise for national 
governments, and was not necessary to achieve the general perspective sought by 
the survey. 
In the following paragraphs, the responses to each individual question are 
summarised.  Main findings are then highlighted and analysed as a group. 
1. Distribution of Lower Tier Sites Among Industry Sectors 
Each respondent provided a detailed answer to this question with the majority also 
including precise figures for each sector.  This level of detail made it possible to 
calculate a reasonable estimate of the number of lower tier sites represented by 
the 27 countries and also analyze answers with respect to the relative and absolute 
size of the Seveso influence in their country. 
Figure 8 on the next page shows the number of lower tier sites per respondent, 
with the exception of Denmark and Switzerland for which no data are available.  
The red line indicates the median.  Where respondents provided precise data, 
these data are reflected in the chart; otherwise, the most recent SPIRS data were 
used (March 2009).  Data for two out of sixteen German Länder were also not 
available.  Although the EU-15 contain the vast majority of lower tier sites in the 
EU, there is a fairly even mix of EU-15 and new Member States above and below 
the median.  As shown in Figure 9 on the next page, two thirds of reporting 
countries have more lower tier than upper tier sites (above the dotted line), with 
                                                 
12 Note: For every question, Switzerland is included in the response data presented except when it 
is specifically indicated that it is not. 
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 one country having a one-to-one ratio (including Germany if it is assumed that the 
14 German Länder are representative of the overall German situation).   
 
Figure 8:  Number of Lower Tier Sites Per Respondent Country 
 
Table 2:  Statistics on Number of Lower Tier Sites per Country 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Median Std. Deviation 
25 4 979 170.00 71 256.102 
 
 
 
Figure 9:  Ratio of Lower Tier to Upper Tier Sites in Surveyed Countries (N = 25) 
 
In terms of industry sector, there was no “typical” mix of sectors represented by 
lower tiers.  However, a number of sectors have a significant presence (>5%) in 
several countries.  In particular: 
1. Distribution centres (LPG, fuels, warehouses) accounted for at least 1/3 of 
all LT sites in several countries (11 countries). 
2. The general chemicals sector is significantly represented in most countries 
with > 100 Seveso sites (15 countries). 
3. Other industries >5% presence in several countries were fertilizers and 
pesticides (storage and production), power supply and metal surface 
treatment. 
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 2. Economic Character of Lower Tier Sites (Respondent Estimates) 
As noted in Table 3 below, most respondents estimated that the proportion of 
lower tier sites representing small or medium-size enterprises (SMEs) was 
relatively high.  More than 75% indicated that at least half their sites might be 
SMEs. On average about 25% of lower tier sites were thought to have less than 10 
employees.  Conversely, less than half the sites were estimated to be part of a 
large multinational corporation.  If these estimates are more or less correct, they 
suggest that the resources available to many lower tier sites to manage risks are 
limited.  
Table 3:  Responses to Question 2:  What proportion of your sites  would you 
consider …  
 
N Median Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
a. … are small or 
medium-sized 
enterprises? 
 
24 70% 7% 100% 66% 26.242 
19 (76%) indicated >50 % 
 
b.  … have < 10 
employees?
 
 
21 18% 6% 80% 24% 15.731 
11 (52%) indicated >20 % 
 
c.  … belong to 
multinational 
corporations?
 
22 24% 0% 63% 23% 17.692 
4 (18%) indicated >50% 
 
3. Challenges for Oversight and Enforcement 
As Question 3 was an open-ended question, the percentage of responses 
associated with each type of answer can only be considered an indication.  For 
example, as noted in Figure10 on the next page, a relatively high number of 
respondents identified small/medium enterprises as typical problem sites.  
However, these sites were more likely to be mentioned by respondents since the 
previous question already leads respondents to recall this problem area.  Other 
responses, spontaneously provided by respondents, are more likely to be 
underestimated with the open-ended approach.  Therefore, categories with 5, 4, 3 
and even 2 responses may represent more wide-spread challenges than the 
percentage responses indicate.  (The question was open-ended and therefore, 
individual respondents could have given more than one answer.)   
An analysis of the responses to this question reveals the following findings:
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 Figure 10:  Activities or other site characteristics identified by respondents as 
typical of problem sites (N=21) 
(Respondents could give more than one answer.) 
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 It is quite likely that challenges associated with certain profiles are not 
limited to lower tier sites, as noted by some respondents. The survey did 
not examine whether certain sectors or types of sites represent a higher 
percentage of lower tier sites than of upper tier sites.  If a certain profile 
is more or less equally present in lower tier and upper tier sites, then the 
potential for compliance challenges associated with this profile are not 
likely to differ either, regardless of the site’s Seveso classification.  On 
the other hand, compliance challenges associated with age, complexity, 
atypical sites and newly covered sites are probably shared equally with 
upper tier sites. 
 Small and medium enterprises were cited by ten respondents as having more 
difficulty in complying with the obligations of the Directive.  This situation may 
exist due to a number of factors, such as fewer resources and availability of risk 
management competence.  This finding may also explain why certain sectors 
are often cited as more problematic for Seveso implementation, in particular, 
metal surface treatment, fireworks and explosives storage, agricultural 
chemicals, and fuel storage distribution sites since they may sometimes consist 
of a large number of SMEs.  
One respondent observed that ‘… In these cases the owner / manager is alone 
responsible for everything and these enterprises are, above all else, ruled by 
economic constraints. As an inevitable consequence the operators have only 
little knowledge of the regulations relating to major accidents which makes 
communication between authorities and operators even more difficult.” 
 “Atypical” sites and sites that have never before been covered before by the 
Seveso Directive were also mentioned by some respondents as more prone to 
represent a compliance challenge.  These sites may require time to become 
educated on the types of hazards that may be associated with substances on their 
sites and the concept of systematic risk management strategy. Sectors such as 
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 metal surface treatment and warehouses may experience this handicap in 
particular. 
 
As one respondent noted: 
 “Companies not belonging to the typical chemical, petrochemical or 
pharmaceutical sector seem to have less knowledge of codes of good 
practice applicable and accepted for the (chemical) activity of concern and 
of process safety. Often the dangerous substances that make the company 
a Seveso site are only used for an activity that is only a minor part of the 
companies’ activities (for instance Seveso because of storage of one 
substance used as base product in a metallurgic or surface treatment 
process). In some companies it is only a back-up fuel storage that brings 
them under the Seveso scope. In these companies, authorities (in general) 
spend more time explaining the Seveso obligations.  Inspectors are often 
playing an “advisory” role, giving guidance to the company on how the 
objectives can be met. However, this does not automatically mean that 
enforcement is more difficult. Whether a company takes easily (without 
having to use more stringent coercive instruments) corrective actions to 
eliminate shortcomings notified by inspection authorities, cannot 
univocally be linked to a industrial sector, the Seveso status or the size of 
the company.” 
 The complexity of risk management challenges may present a challenge for 
compliance for some sites, such as warehouses.  One respondent described 
complexity as “The complexity of site – two or more technological/ production 
lines or handling lot of chemicals (about 10-20 and more chemicals which are 
under the Seveso directive).” 
4. Risk Level in Comparison to Upper Tier Sites 
Question 4 was also an open-ended question, but potential responses were more 
limited and therefore, were in greater agreement than Question 3.  Moreover, the 
explanations provided for relative risk differences given in the responses were 
more important to the purposes of the survey than quantification of them.   
In general few respondents gave an unequivocal answer of “higher”, “lower” or 
“no difference”.   In any case, answers were not adequately homogenous that they 
could be quantified in this way.  The question was open-ended and therefore, 
individual respondents could have given more than one answer.  However, Figure 
11 (on the next page) shows that there were only a few different types of 
responses provided (and some respondents gave more than one answer).  This 
result suggests that there is particular consensus on the risk comparison between 
lower and upper tier sites. 
Most respondents appeared to acknowledge that the classification of the site as 
upper or lower tier was a valid, if rough, approximation of relative intrinsic risk 
because it is based on the quantity of hazardous substance present on the site.   
Some respondents gave answers that differentiated the intrinsic risk and residual 
risk and others gave responses reflecting the total risk calculation resulting from 
these two pieces of the risk equation.   
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 Figure 11:  Risk level of lower tier sites compared to upper tier sites (N=25) 
(Respondents could give more than one answer.) 
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For example, one respondent observed that “In relation to hazard in most cases 
there will be very little difference. There is more inherent risk on the upper-tier 
establishments but as these will have better risk management in place the actual 
risk may be greater at lower-tier establishments.”   
For additional illustration, one respondent provided results of the inspection 
authority’s systematic appraisal of inherent risk levels of upper tier and lower tier 
sites in the country.    
 “From [these data] it can be concluded that a major part of lower tier 
sites is ranked into the lowest danger category, but still one out of five 
has been estimated as highly (potentially) dangerous. For upper tier 
sites, the most hazardous category (cat 3) is the biggest group. The 
difference between upper tier and lower tier can be explained by the 
activity (no chemical reactions involved) and the amount of dangerous 
substance (which plays a role in the calculation)” 
This respondent also added that lack of data prevented the authority from 
performing a similar appraisal of residual risk. Furthermore, it should also be 
recalled that lower tier sites may also have quantities of dangerous substances in 
amounts very close to the upper tier threshold.   
Several respondents noted that location and lack of competency influenced the 
level of risk.  Explained one respondent: 
“Whilst a lower-tier site will have a smaller quantity of dangerous 
substances present, factors such as the type and complexity of the 
operation, the level of implementation of standards of safety, and the 
preparedness/professionalism of the workers generally – and 
particularly in the event of an accident – could lead to a lower tier site 
presenting higher levels of individual risk than an upper tier site. 
Similarly, while higher quantities of substances are likely to create a 
higher level of societal risk (i.e. more people at more risk) at upper tier 
sites, it is possible that societal risk could be higher around a lower-tier 
site.  This is because the assessment must consider the off-site 
situation as well as that on-site.  Factors such as the location of the site 
(e.g. in a residential area), the surrounding population density and type 
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 (e.g. an office building or hospital/school), the type of buildings in the 
area (e.g. high/low housing density), and the type of accident which 
could potentially occur at the site, could possibly lead to more people 
being at more risk around a lower-tier site, despite there being a 
smaller quantity of dangerous substances present.  We estimate that 
only a very small number lower tier sites (possibly 1-2%) are of 
societal risk concern.” 
Another respondent described influences on risks at Seveso sites in this way: 
“The risk level (independently on category of an establishment) is connected with 
the following factors: 
a) Potential risk: 
 technological solutions applied, including, for example, storage 
methods – type of tank, its technical condition and location 
(underground, on the ground, etc.).  
 category, quantity and properties of substances present, 
 the establishment’s location, e.g., in relation to residential areas or 
legally protected areas and distance between establishments 
(domino effect), 
 types of technical and organizational safety measures applied, 
 educational level of staff. 
b) Residual risk (after safety measures have been taken into account): 
 dangerous substances other than those classifying an establishment 
into the lower or upper tier group, 
 external factors (beyond the establishment) which can cause a 
major accident inside the establishment, 
 effectiveness of technical inspections [for compliance with 
technical standards] 
 a clear, understandable (at each level) safety management system.” 
 
Questions on Article 7 Requirements and Enforcement Practices 
 
5. Legal Obligations Imposed on Lower Tier Sites  
In keeping with the principle of proportionality, Member States may define 
Article 7 compliance expectations for the MAPP in terms of systematic vs. 
flexible components.  Systematic components are represented by both legal 
obligations and also by norms and guidance for compliance established by the 
competent authorities.  Flexible components are those documents and 
demonstrations that are requested on a case by case basis. 
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 Questions 6 and 7 aim to distinguish 
the degree to which countries have 
established fixed requirements for the 
MAPP and the type of contents and 
level of detail that are systematically 
required.  Specifically, Question 7 
asked how Member States and EEA 
countries define legal requirements on 
lower tier sites associated with Article 
7.  In transposing EU directives, 
Member States and EEA countries 
have discretion to choose the national 
forms and methods of implementation which are best suited to ensure the 
effectiveness of Community law.  Therefore, in principle, EU and EEA countries 
are only bound to require a MAPP document, but Member/EEA states may 
expand the legal requirements for lower tier sites to achieve the Directive’s 
objectives as they consider appropriate.   
Figure 12:  Article 7 Requirements in EU 
and EEA Countries 
As shown in Figure 12 on the following page, over sixty percent of EU and 
EEA13 countries impose a specific legal obligation, or obligations, on lower tier 
sites in addition to the MAPP.  Table 4 below lists the types of instruments th
are additionally required in these countries by legislation.  Eight countries 
at 
 
 
 
 performed in 
 
here is a land use planning policy and most often an 
n with 
tier 
sed on upper tier sites), or otherwise, not directly 
associated with Article 7.   
                                                
explicitly  
require an SMS while three other countries require an “implementation” 
document in lieu of a full SMS.  Although Norway does not specifically require
an SMS in legislation implementing the Seveso II Directive, it is counted here 
because of the pre-existing Internal Control Act of 1992.  This legislation requires
that every enterprise should undertake systematic actions (at the enterprise level)
to ensure and document that the activities of health and safety are
accordance with requirements specified in laws and regulations. 
Five countries require an emergency plan.  France indicated that a safety report is
required, commenting that “We have the same approach with the lower tier that 
we have with the upper tier. T
internal emergency plan.”    
It should be noted, however, that this table summarises what countries have 
reported as specific requirements on lower tier sites, mainly enforced through 
Article 7.  The survey only asked about requirements imposed in associatio
Article 7.  It is possible that Seveso countries may also impose additional 
requirements on sites, beyond the requirements of the Seveso II Directive,  that 
were not mentioned in the survey either because they are not specific to lower 
sites (i.e., they are also impo
 
13 Switzerland is not included in the numbers presented for this section because it does not apply 
Article 7 of the Directive. 
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 Table 4:  Legal Obligation(s) Imposed on Lower Tier Sites in Addition to the MAPP 
 
Country 
SMS 
Emergency 
Plan 
Risk 
Assessment
14 
Safety 
Report Other 
Austria  Implementation must be described 
Belgium   Emergency plan . Implementation must be 
described 
Czech Republic    
Estonia   
Finland    
France     
Germany    
Hungary      
Italy  Simplified safety report in some regions 
Latvia   
Luxembourg   
Netherlands   
Norway   
Slovakia   
Slovenia  Implementation must be described 
Sweden   
Total 8 5 3 1
   = legal requirement exists 
 
 
6. Content and Format of a MAPP 
Assessing the difference in legal obligations does not in itself provide a sufficient 
comparison of Article 7 requirements across the Seveso implementing countries.  
The legal burden imposed by Article 7 is also represented by norms and 
expectations concerning MAPP content or accompanying documents routinely 
requested by competent authorities.  MAPP guidance for operators and inspection 
practices create de facto requirements enforced through other competent authority 
powers not specific to the Seveso II Directive.  Question 7 aimed to identify what 
expectations for documents and demonstration, beyond legal obligations, 
                                                 
14 This number is likely to underestimate the number of Seveso countries that require a risk 
assessment of lower tier sites (and also upper tier sites).  In many Seveso countries compliance is 
evaluated with the expectation that a risk assessment has been conducted even though legal 
requirements may not make specific mention of it. 
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 countries had systematically established as representative of basic compliance 
with Article 7. 
For this reason, the survey also asked respondents to describe the content and 
format of MAPPs typically considered acceptable by the authorities. The question 
specifically asked respondents to estimate a typical the length and table of 
contents of the MAPP.  They were also asked to describe any guidance developed 
addressing the MAPP requirements. 
The analysis provided here is at best an approximation of the differences 
reflecting only a general impression of how the countries may differ in terms of 
the nature and complexity of MAPP requirements imposed on LT site operators.   
A more precise analysis is probably not possible via questionnaire since 
interpretation of what is required and what is not required, and the degree to 
which requirements are made simple or complex, is very subjective to a country 
and sometimes to an individual authority. 
Several respondents mentioned the subjective nature of the process.  One 
respondent gave the following list of factors affecting MAPP length and structure 
in the country: 
 the individual approach of the person elaborating the MAPP, 
 the size and complexity of the management structure and procedures used in 
the establishment, 
 the type of installation,   
 the type and quantity of dangerous substances, and 
 the probability of  a major accident.occurrence. 
In fact the survey reveals that a number of both objective and subjective factors 
may pre-determine the content of what is considered to be the MAPP document 
proper (i.e., without annexes).  According to the survey, the most prevalent 
factors tend to be: 
 The legal requirements imposed on the structure and content of the MAPP.  
This question did not specifically ask if the content of the MAPP was 
determined by legislation but according to the survey at least four (4) 
countries indicated having specific legal requirements.   
 Guidelines and enforcement practice that make certain MAPP content more 
or less standard.  An additional eleven countries provided a specific 
“typical” table of contents that reflected guidance issued by the authorities 
or (presumably) a specific enforcement preference of authorities. 
 The complexity of the site. Sixteen (16) respondents (76%) noted that 
length varies with complexity.    
 The degree to which enforcement is adapted individually to the 
characteristics of the site.  Five countries specifically mentioned that the 
MAPP varied considerably dependent on the nature of the site. 
Moreover, the responses to the question about content of a MAPP generally refer 
to systematic, that is, uniform practice in the country.  On an individual basis, 
various documentation and demonstration may be requested of lower tier sites 
based on the judgment of the case officer.   
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Length of the MAPP 
Figure 13 below shows the wide range of responses received concerning the 
length of the document. The minimum length reported was 1 page and the 
maximum length of over 200 pages.  Aggregating the 20 responses that provided 
specific figures, the average of the minimum and maximum lengths estimated was 
13.5 pages and 52 pages, respectively.  Five of these respondents gave the typical 
length as less than 5 pages.  In two of the latter cases, the respondent specifically 
indicated that the MAPP was considered an introduction to other documentation 
(e.g., emergency response plan) that was also routinely requested (to show 
implementation of the MAPP). 
Figure 13:  Length of Typical MAPP in EU and EEA Countries (N=26) 
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Length <= 5 pages
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 Table of Contents of the MAPP 
According to fourteen (14), that is, sixty percent (60%) of respondents the MAPP 
table of contents was similar to that of an SMS (see Figure 14 at left).  The other 
40% described a MAPP that mirrored the structure of a safety report (including 
the Swiss “reduced safety report”).  
Another respondent who is not included in 
this figure indicated that either model 
could be followed in a given situation.  
The 14 German Länder responses are also 
not included in these figures because they 
were not homogeneous.  However, they 
reflected the same mixed tendency as the 
other respondents with a similar 
preponderance of SMS structured MAPPs.   
It appeared that most countries did not 
automatically assume that the MAPP 
would include a risk assessment.  This expectation was more likely in countries 
who identified the MAPP with the safety report structure.  Indeed, four out of five 
countries reporting that the MAPP contained a risk assessment, followed the 
safety report model.  (One country that followed the MAPP-as-SMS model also 
requested a risk assessment.)  One country required all three and perhaps not 
coincidentally, this was the same respondent whose MAPP document was 
reported to typically exceed 200 pages.   
Figure 14:  MAPP Table of Contents  
Relationship of Length to Content of the MAPP 
Responses related to length and content of the MAPP are influenced especially by 
differences in how countries define the MAPP proper (that is, excluding annexes). 
Some countries described contents as more of a demonstration or explanatory 
document, that is, requiring detailed explanation or justification for the elements 
defined by the MAPP, including in many cases a risk assessment.  Of these 
countries several indicated that typical contents of the MAPP mirrored the 
contents of a safety report (Annex II of the Directive).   Whilst in a number of 
other countries appeared to take a “summary” approach, in which the MAPP 
summarises the safety measures and/or elements of the safety management system 
very briefly.  The annex will then (usually) contain the external document that 
defines the element. 
For the survey, most respondents indicated whether their response on length 
included annexes.  Ten respondents said that their estimate of length was all-
inclusive (3 with maximum length > 100 pages).  In contrast, 5 countries 
indicated that their estimate was not all-inclusive.  It can also be assumed 
generally that those respondents reporting very short MAPPs (< 5) did not include 
annexed documents.   
Although Switzerland does not apply the MAPP requirement, it implements a 
system in which authorities require a “reduced safety report”.  On the basis of this 
reduced safety report, Swiss authorities will determine if a more elaborate report 
is needed.  This respondent noted that “Length varies greatly depending on the 
size or complexity of the site. As quantity thresholds in the Ordinance on Major 
Accidents are very low, the minimum may be a few pages. Very long reports are 
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 generally not required (due to the physical proximity of cantonal authorities and 
enterprises, meetings are held to decide on which elements the reports should 
concentrate). For more complex sites, reports can be made sequentially for 
different parts of the site.” 
The data suggest that the length and complexity of a MAPP is also related to the 
degree to which the MAPP is viewed as a summary document vs. a demonstration 
document.  A comparison of maximum and minimum length and the prevailing 
approach (summary vs. demonstration) revealed a significant (99.9%)  positive 
correlation between length and reports aligned more with a demonstration than 
summary approach.  The lack of a significant correlation with minimum length 
suggests that the demonstration approach does not guarantee a lengthy report.  
This finding is consistent with observations that site complexity and relative risk 
are also factors influencing report length.  Furthermore, there may also be a 
relationship between length and the degree to which content is legally mandated.    
MAPP Guidance Documents 
As indicated in Figure 15 below, over half of the respondent countries have 
created their own guidance for operators on development of the SMS that includes 
a description of the MAPP.  Four countries also cited the EU guidance as a 
reference; in two of these countries it appeared to be the principal guidance used.  
Three out of four countries who cited as guidance the MAPP definition in their 
legislation, said that this definition was the only specific guidance on this topic in 
their country.  Three countries did not provide any specific guidance.   
Eleven (46%) respondents noted that MAPPs are assessed by authorities and 3 
(13%) specifically said that they were not.  (The question was open-ended and 
therefore, individual respondents could have given more than one answer.)  
Nearly a third of respondents have also created guidance for competent authorities 
on assessing the MAPP/SMS and two countries also use this document as their 
guidance for operators  
Annex 2 contains a list of guidance available for both MAPP and SMS in Member 
States.     
 
Figure 15:  Guidance Used to Develop/Assess the MAPP (N=27) 
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 7. Functional Role of the MAPP 
Use of the MAPP in Enforcement Actions 
A majority of respondents indicated that Article 7 requirements were directly used 
as a basis for enforcement action (see Figure 16 below).  Three respondents that 
did not routinely use the MAPP in enforcement.  Two of these respondents, 
Belgium and Germany, indicated that stronger enforcement authority lay in other 
provisions.  One German Länder respondent indicated that this practice was 
largely due to the implementation legislation.  “… Enforcement measures are 
generally not based on Article 8 of the Major Accidents Ordinance/ Article 7 of 
the Seveso II Directive. Basis for enforcement measures are mainly the specific 
requirements for safety of installations laid down in licensing notices or other 
legal provisions, e.g. workplace safety regulations and the corresponding 
technical provisions.  According to the Belgian respondent, “The development of 
a specific document as required in article 7 has so far not been enforced. See also 
the answer to question 6a: if the operator of a lower tier site has implemented a 
safety management system responding to annex III, a separate MAPP document is 
not necessary.”   
Figure 17 on the next page shows how the MAPP typically function as part of the 
competent authority’s enforcement programme.  (The question was open-ended 
and therefore, individual respondents 
could have given more than one a
Notably 16 (60%) of responding 
countries affirmed that verification 
the existence of the MAPP is a routine 
enforcement action. Thirteen (13 or just 
under 50%) also
nswer.)  
of 
 cited MAPP as a basis 
 strategy.  According to the 
o 
ich 
nagement systems operate: 
ents 
 
establishment and the Competent Authority’s knowledge of the site …” 
 
for inspections. 
Both Poland and the United Kingdom 
provided detailed descriptions of how 
the MAPP was incorporated in 
enforcement
UK respondent, 
“The MAPP informs the intervention strategy and is assessed during 
inspection and other intervention visits to verify the control measures t
prevent/mitigate the effects of potential major accidents.  The UK has 
adopted an integrated approach to implementation of Article 7 in wh
Figure 16:  Use of the MAPP in 
Enforcement Actions 
there are three levels at which safety ma
• Level 1 – management arrangem
• Level 2 – risk control systems 
• Level 3 – workplace precautions. 
A balanced intervention approach should incorporate all three levels and
inspectors are able to enforce across each level. The inspection activity 
should be proportionate to the scale and complexity of the hazards at the 
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Figure 17:  Use of the MAPP in Competent Authority Activities (N=23) 
The approach in Poland was described as follows:  
“During inspections in the lower tier establishments carried out by the 
competent authorities the following issues are checked: 
 if the MAPP fulfills the law requirements, 
 if the information included in the document is reliable and refers to the 
actual safety level in the establishment, 
 if the safety system has been implemented, 
 if the MAPP is being revised, 
 if the MAPP is up to date, and 
 if the MAPP is effective/efficacious/efficient …” 
 
Role in Management of Site Risks 
Out of 24 respondents to this question, 23 (96%) considered that the MAPP was 
helpful to operators in management of site risks, as shown in Figure 18 below. 
One respondent did not consider that the MAPP had any influence on site risk 
management.  More specifically 14 (58%) considered the MAPP a useful 
instrument for ensuring that an SMS is implemented on the site.  One respondent 
explained that   
“The general approach of lower-tier establishments with regard to major 
accident hazards is that by managing health and safety at work and by 
introducing environmental protection regime in accordance with ISO 
 
 
Figure 18:  Benefits of MAPP for Site Risk Management (N=24) 
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 14001 all necessary measures have been undertaken also to control risks 
of major accident hazards.”   
Another respondent agreed with this perspective but expressed reservations.   
“To work with the policy and SMS helps the operator to get a well-
structured safety improvement work cycle. A condition for this is however 
that there are resources for the work and that the work is established and 
approved by the senior management of the company.” 
A third respondent highlighted the paradox of Article 7 in that its very 
flexibility of interpretation for Member States represents both a distinct 
advantage and a potential pitfall for meeting implementation objectives.  
“For small and non complex establishments, Article 7 has the merit that 
their way of working can be described in a single (controlled) document 
instead of formal procedures for the different elements of Annex III. On 
the other hand, Article 7 is in our opinion too ambiguously worded and 
can be read as aiming only at a one page “declaration” of accident 
prevention policy.” 
 
8. Legal Obligations Regarding Safety Management Systems 
Thirteen (50%) respondents said that they specifically required lower tier sites to 
implement a safety management 
system.  This result is in conflict 
with the responses in Section 5 
(see Table 4, page 16) 
concerning legal obligations, in 
which only eight countries 
reported an SMS legal 
requirement.  The written 
comments suggest, however, tha
these five countries in actuality 
do not have a legal obliga
se for SMS but standard 
enforcement practice functions 
are similar to France, 
Switzerland and Finland.   These
three other countries indicated that they did not literally impose a legal obligation
specifically for SMS but that enforcement practice or legal interpretation 
delivered an equivalent, or nearly equivalent, result.  France obliged lower tier 
sites to establish “procedures of risk management that are less complex [than 
those of upper tier sites] and that can be [more limited] than a complete SMS.”  
The Swiss respondent explained that “The guidance for the application of [the 
Swiss legislation] gives SMS the status of a good practice according to [this
t 
tion per 
 
 
 
ity of Guidance on Implementation of Safety Management 
general 
Figure 19:  Legal Obligatons for 
SMS on Lower Tier Sites 
legislation].  There is therefore an implicit requirement.’ 
9. Availabil
Systems 
In answer to this question, respondents listed available guidance for lower tier 
sites on implementation of the SMS.  Most publications cited appear to be 
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 SMS guidance.  There does not appear to be any country that has specific 
guidance on SMS for lower tier sites.  Annex 3 provides a list of the informatio
provided by re
n 
spondents on guidance for implementing the SMS developed in 
ion of Lower Tier Sites 
ng 
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establishments all of this must be set out in writing and demonstrated in the safety 
report. For lower-tier sites there is [a lower obligation] for documentation and 
overt demonstration.”
their country. 
10. Criteria for Evaluat
Safety Report vs. MAPP 
This part of the question asked respondents to indicate how criteria for evaluati
lower tier sites differ from criteria for evaluating upper tier sites for the safety 
conceptual differences between the safety 
report and the MAPP in many countries
the majority of respondents (9 or 35%)
responded that criteria was almost the 
same and another 9 (35%) indicated t
they were only somewhat different.  
Several respondents said that they could 
not make a comparison because competent 
authorities were not obliged to evaluate 
the MAPP in their country.  As one 
country noted:  “Evaluation criteria for SR
of UT-sites (a comprehensive officia
document on safety relevant issues) can 
not be compared at all with the criteria for the MAPP document (a simple 
report vs. MAPPs.  In general, despite
Figure 20:  Criteria for Evaluation of 
MAPP vs. Safety Reports 
er with the concise SMS) of the lower 
tier sites.” 
Evaluation of the Safety Manag
System 
This part of the question asked 
respondents to indicate how criteria for 
evaluating lower tier sites differ from 
criteria for evaluating upper tier si
implementation of the SMS.  Evaluatio
of SMS appears to be much more 
uniform between lower and upper tie
sites in comparison to evaluation of 
safety reports/MAPP (see Figure 2
below).  It was indicated by one country 
that “Practically (without explic
requirement) the inspection authoritie
follow the more detailed requirements for upper tier sites, with less forma
in essence with the same form of screening.” Five respondents (20%) indicated 
that evaluation of the SMS was somewhat different between upper and lower tier 
sites.  One respondent explained:  "All establishments have to have suitable pol
and implement of that policy in relation to major hazards. For upper-tier 
Figure 21:  Comparison of Evaluation 
of SMS on Upper vs. Lower Tier Sites 
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11. Recommendations and Comments 
For the last question, respondents were invited to provide any recommendations 
of comments on implementation of Article 7.  At least half of respondents listed 
recommendations, usually several of them.  There was not a lot of commonality 
between the recommendations.  The recommendation to make SMS requirements 
equivalent for lower and upper tier sites was mentioned 4 times, the highest of 
any recommendation.  There were eight MAPP-specific recommendations and 
seven SMS-related recommendations.   
Table 5:  Summary of Most Frequently Cited Topics for Recommendations 
Recommendation 
Number of 
respondents 
Should have same SMS requirements for both LT & UT 4 
MAPP should be required to be submitted 3 
Depth of risk analysis should be proportionate to risk 3 
Require specification of activities of LT for emergencies 3 
Not much difference between UT and LT 2 
Safety report should be imposed on LT 2 
Clearer guidance on safety measures (for all sites) for LTs 2 
MAPP and SMS should not be submitted to competent authority 1 
Enhance importance of SMS, clarify and intensify attention
 1 
Should be deadline for MAPP revisions 1 
No safety report requirement should be imposed on LT 1 
Employees should be involved in elaboration of the MAPP 1 
Location should be considered as part of LT/UT criterion 1 
LT should be inspected as frequently as UT 1 
Clear instructions are needed on how to document, safe-keep and 
present the MAPP+SMS  1 
LT should be inspected as frequently as UT 1 
MAPP does not fit with increasing certification needs 
(standardisation of practices such as ISO) 1 
Operators should have regular change of experience 1 
 
There were also opposing points of view represented in the recommendations 
with three respondents advocating that the MAPP  be submitted to the authorities 
and one respondent opposed to this measure.  Likewise two respondents 
advocated requiring a safety report of lower tier sites and one respondent was 
opposed to this measure. 
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 Conclusions from the Survey 
The survey responses produced several important insights in regard to the 
character of lower tier sites, and requirements and practices associated with 
implementation of Article 7 in the Member States and EEA countries.  Countries 
were also able to express their opinion about the usefulness of Article 7 
requirements and particular challenges as well as benefits linked with this 
provision and with the way in which it is implemented in their country in 
particular.  Survey results also  provided a perspective on how Switzerland, an 
EFTA country, adjusted the regulatory burden for lower risk sites.   
The following points highlight the most important findings: 
• A considerable portion of lower tier sites are a significant challenge for 
Seveso implementation because of limited resources and risk 
management capacity.  In many countries, more than half of lower tier sites 
are SMEs.  SMEs were also cited  by many countries as a particular challenge 
for enforcement and implementation.  This finding also may explain why 
certain sectors, often dominated by SMEs, are often cited as more problematic 
for Seveso implementation, in particular, metal surface treatment, fireworks 
and explosives storage, agricultural chemicals and fuel storage distribution 
sites.   
• Residual risk and location are factors that can make lower tier sites a 
higher risk than upper tier sites.  Respondents generally agreed that lower 
quantities of dangerous substances present lower intrinsic risk potential.  
However, risk level is not just a function of quantity, but of location and 
competence in risk management.  Lower tier sites located near population 
centres or with limited resources may be of higher concern than upper tier 
sites. 
• Challenges associated with certain Seveso site profiles are not 
limited to lower tier sites.  For example, compliance challenges 
associated with age, complexity, atypical sites and newly covered sites 
are probably shared equally with upper tier sites. 
• Many countries have defined a specific legal requirements associated with 
Article 7 in more detail than the Directive.   The Directive only specifies 
that a Major Accident Prevention Policy (MAPP) is required.  However, in 
over sixty percent of the responding countries, the MAPP definition has 
included more detail.  Most commonly (8 countries or 31%, excluding 
Switzerland), the MAPP is defined to include elaboration of a safety 
management system (SMS).  In other countries, an emergency planning or 
risk assessment must be included.  One country requires a full safety report. 
• Nearly sixty-percent of the countries surveyed impose a legal obligation, 
or equivalent, on lower tier sites to implement an SMS.   Moreover, the 
enforcement practices of several countries make an SMS a de facto 
requirement for lower tier sites.  In these cases, the MAPP itself as a 
document, may or may not be considered as a separate entity, from the SMS.   
• Countries are more or less split in terms of whether they define the 
MAPP as a reduced SMS or as a reduced safety report.  Thirteen, or nearly 
half, use Seveso Annex III (elements of an SMS) as the defining structure.  
Seven (26%) define the MAPP in terms of Annex II (elements of a safety 
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 report).  At least three countries consider that a MAPP should address both 
elements of safety report and a safety management system.   
• Not all countries systematically require a risk assessment.  Countries that 
identified the MAPP with safety report requirements also tended to expect the 
MAPP to include a risk assessment. 
• The type of content that constitutes the MAPP proper (without annexes) 
varies considerably from country to country.  Twenty-one countries (75%) 
usually had MAPPs under 50 pages, and a little over 20% were under 5 pages.  
The mean of estimated minimum lengths was 13.5 pages and the mean of 
estimated maximum lengths was 52 pages. The data also suggest that the 
length of a MAPP is related to the degree to which the MAPP is viewed as a 
summary document vs. a demonstration document.   However, other 
influences, such as site complexity and relative risk, almost certainly play a 
role in determining document size. 
• Most of the countries used the MAPP for enforcement and nearly all felt 
that the MAPP was also useful for the operators.  For enforcement the 
most common activities involving the MAPP were (in order of frequency) 
verification that the MAPP existed, inspection on the basis of the MAPP, and 
assessment of the quality of the MAPP.   
• Many countries routinely assess the quality of the MAPP.  However, the 
exact proportion was not clear from responses because this question was not 
specifically asked.  A total of eleven countries (42%, excluding Switzerland) 
volunteered that they regularly assessed the quality of the MAPP. Three 
(12%) reported that they did not. 
• Many countries did not use the same criteria for evaluating MAPPs in 
lower sites as used to evaluate the safety report in upper tier sites.  This is 
not surprising considering the finding cited above, that many countries 
consider the MAPP to be a reduced SMS, not a reduced safety report. 
• Countries are more inclined to apply a similar approach to evaluating the 
SMS on lower as for upper tier sites. For SMS evaluation the split was 
30/60 (more countries used similar criteria for LT and UT).  Sixty percent (14 
countries) indicated that it was almost the same. 
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 Part 2:  The Seminar on Major Accident Prevention in Lower Tier Seveso 
Establishments 
This one-day seminar was co-hosted by the European Commission and the Czech 
Ministry of Environment as a follow-up to the survey.  It took place on 22 April 
2009 in Prague, Czech Republic, coinciding with a meeting of the Committee of 
Seveso Competent Authorities.  Around 80 people attended the seminar, mainly 
from Seveso competent authorities.  Almost all Member States, Candidate 
Countries, EEA and EFTA countries were represented.   
The agenda (see Annex 4) consisted of a presentation on the survey findings and 
presentations by industry and various countries (both Member States and 
countries outside the EU) aimed to provide a perspective on regulatory 
arrangements to establish effective risk management on lower hazard sites 
(classified as “lower tier sites” within the Seveso regime).  These presentations 
were followed by group discussions intended to identify common points of 
interest and recommendations for regulatory policy and implementation. 
Industry and Country Presentations 
The five presentations were as follows: 
6. Seveso Impacts - Article 7 - Lower Tier sites by Douglas Leech, FECC - 
European Association of Chemical Distributors/CBA Chemical Business 
Association 
7. Implementation of Lower Tier Site Requirements in the Czech Republic, by 
Stanislav Malý, Occupational Safety Research Institute, Czech Republic  
8. Implementation of Lower Tier Site Requirements in Italy, Andrea Santucci, 
Ministry of Environment, Italy 
9. Addressing Low Thresholds in Switzerland, Bernard Gay, Federal Office 
for Environment (FOEN), Switzerland 
10. Korean Experience of Process Safety Management Systems in the Chemical 
Industry.  Hyuckmyun Kwon, Occupational Safety and Health Agency 
(KOSHA), Korea 
Highlights from each presentation are presented in the paragraphs below.  The 
agenda of the seminar is available in Annex 4. 
Perspective of the FECC - European Association of Chemical Distributors/CBA 
Chemical Business Association 
FECC represents around an industry of around 1,600 companies, the majority of 
which are SMEs.  In total the industry accounts for about 33,000 employees and 
€30 billion/year in sales revenues across Europe.  The direct membership of 
FECC includes 240 SEVESO sites, of which 72 are upper tier and 168 are lower 
tier.   
The presentation indicated that, due to the large number of chemical distributors 
that are SMEs, Seveso compliance could be particularly challenging for members 
of this industry.   In particular, it is in the interests of small businesses with 
limited resources to remain as lower tier sites, but the complexity of Seveso 
classification criteria complicates such attempts.  In particular, for distribution 
sites, each substance must be evaluated in terms of how it should be counted or 
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 not in accordance with the summation rule15.  In addition, dangerous substances 
in transport will be labelled in accordance with norms established for internationa
dangerous goods transport
l 
                                                
16 but may not have safety data sheets with the 
European classification.   
The presentation observed, however, that lower tier site status can remain a 
disproportionately heavy burden for small business.  For example, the French 
requirement of a safety report and the UK practice of charging sites for competent 
authority services can represent heavy cost burdens for these sites.  The 
complexity, and therefore, cost, of implementation can also increase when more 
than one authority is involved enforcement, as is the case in many EU countries. 
Perspective of the Czech Republic 
According to the presentation, there are 76 lower tier establishments in the Czech 
Republic as of March 2009.  Czech legislation obliges an operator of such an 
establishment to prepare a “Safety Programme”.  Subsequently, the government 
published a regulation defining the scope and rules for preparing and updating the 
safety programme.  In general, the regulation requires the operator to prepare a 
draft safety programme based on the results of a major accident risk assessment.  
The safety programme must describe the overall principles applied for prevention 
of major accidents, the structure and system of safety management to protect 
human beings, domestic animals, the environment, and property. If designated a 
domino site by the regional authority, the operator is obliged to preventative 
safety measures related to potential domino effects.  
In essence the same structure and content of the analysis and assessment of risk is 
required for both upper and lower tier sites in the Czech Republic. This approach 
is based on the philosophy that the potential off-site consequences of an accident 
may be more or less equivalent for lower and upper tier sites in many situations.  
For this reason, the Czech government determined that there should be only one 
single document required of Seveso sites, prepared with greater or lesser detail 
taking into consideration the extent of information, procedures and steps required 
for each site. The depth of the analysis and assessment of risk depends on the 
hazard posed by the dangerous substances present on the site, how they are 
processed and handled,  and potential off-site impacts on the surroundings of the 
site.   
The presentation also noted that in principle, it is possible to divide the required 
elements of the safety programme into different categories of importance as 
follows: 
• items with a fundamental importance,  
• items providing supplementary information, 
• items for specific types of establishments and irrelevant operational activities 
 
15 Annex 1, Part 2, Note 4 of the Seveso II Directive provides an algorithm for adding up 
quantities of dangerous substance categories on-site, in the case of an establishment where no 
individual substance or preparation is present in a quantity above or equal to the relevant 
qualifying quantities.  This algorithm is called the “summation rule”. 
16 The UN Model Regulations for the Transport of Dangerous Goods ) 
http://www.unece.org/trans/danger/danger.htm) are the basis for classification and labelling 
requirements of dangerous goods transported within and from Europe and are also generally 
followed by external EU trading partners. 
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 This division into categories of importance allows some discretion in applying the 
structure to specific establishments.  The value, weight, importance and the 
expected level of detail of the information of the individual items may differ case 
by case depending on each individual situation. 
The presentation cited lack of appropriate information as a deficiency in many 
safety programme descriptions.  For example, the introduction to the document 
often does not fully describe the establishment.  There may be insufficient 
information on the amounts and type of hazardous materials.  Several elements 
may not be described with precision and accuracy, such as the technology used, 
operating parameters, and the character of the external surroundings.  
This presentation also included a brief description of the 17 chapters of the Safety 
Programme document and of the SMS requirements. 
The Perspective from Italy 
Currently, Italy has a total of 1,088 Seveso sites, of whom 517 (48%) are upper 
tier and 571 (52%) are lower tier.  Under Italian law, lower tier sites must comply 
with the following legal requirements: 
• Notification and information on safety measures 
• Major accident prevention policy  
• Safety management system  
• External emergency plans  
• Hazard control measures  
• Documentation of risk analysis 
In Italy notification must include certain schematic information on the risk 
management measures that have been adopted by the operator.  Depending on the 
region, this information may include a description of the nature of the risks, 
potential of impact on people and the environment, prevention measures taken, 
main elements of the external emergency plan, the safety data sheet of the 
involved substances, and the severity and consequences associated with accident 
scenarios.   
The presentation noted that 75% (>400 sites) of lower tier sites in Italy are 
estimated to be SMEs and nearly 40% (>200 sites) are estimated to have less than 
10 employees.  Typically, sites in the latter category consist of a family owned 
activity and have a maximum of 2-3 employees, where a single person may play 
many roles (e.g., safety manager).  It can be culturally difficult for the authorities 
to achieve proper execution of MAPP and SMS requirements.  Sectors well-
represented among small sites include surface metal treatment and fireworks 
manufacturers. 
The presentation highlighted that MAPP and notification data may provide 
insufficient information on lower tier site hazards to authorities.  The notification 
tends to include the results of risk analyses but no detail on the risk elements.  
This lack of information can pose a particular impediment to effective land-use 
and emergency planning.  Hence, while there is a concern about over-burdening 
small sites with too many requirements, there is an equal concern that competent 
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 authorities do not have adequate detail about the hazards on site to take 
appropriate measures to protect the population.   
The presentation posed several thought - provoking questions in regard to 
addressing the challenge associated with Seveso compliance on small sites: 
• How can the authorities/regulatory requirements help the operators of small 
sites to understand and implement an SMS effectively? 
• Could it be useful to provide simplified compliance criteria for “non complex” 
activities? 
• Could it be useful to oblige sites to draw up a simple “safety document”(a 
kind of “light “safety report) ? 
• Could the Directive include a more simplified criteria or derogation for when 
hazardous substances or preparations on site do not give rise to a major 
accident risk? 
Perspective from Switzerland 
The current Swiss Ordinance on Major Accidents (OMA) entered into force in 
1991.  It contains some important differences in scope from the Seveso II 
Directive.  In particular, since smaller installations were found to be more 
integrated in urban tissue, ordinance threshold quantities were set particularly low.   
Hence, OMA also covers installations that, if the Seveso Directive were operative 
in Switzerland, would not qualify as lower tier sites.   OMA also covers major 
hazards associated with roads, pipelines and transport on the Rhine. 
For this reason, there is no summation rule for calculating regulatory coverage. 
(The latter omission also caused some installations to drop out of coverage.)  In 
addition, OMA establishes a two-step procedure of which the first step is very 
simple (see Figure 22, below).   
Figure 22:  Implementation Process of the Swiss  
Ordinance on Major Accidents (OMA) 
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 In the first step of the procedure, the operator must develop and submit a 
summary report with the following information: 
• a short description of the establishment, incl. a layout plan and details of the 
surrounding area; 
• for  substances, products or special wastes which may be present in the 
establishment in quantities exceeding the threshold quantities: the maximum 
quantities that may be present; 
• details of the safety measures; 
• an estimation of the extent of possible damage to the public or the 
environment that may result from major accidents. 
In order to prepare the report, the owner must carry out an assessment of the 
maximum damage that may be caused to the public or the environment.  This 
assessment can be a rough, conservative estimate.  It is often based on a 
standardized methodology jointly developed by stakeholders.  It is considered part 
of the environmental impact assessment and as such is made available to third 
parties and the public.   
Based on the authority’s analysis, a site may or may not have to complete the 
second procedure.  To evaluate the summary report, the authorities must evaluate 
whether the assumption can be made that serious damage to the public or the 
environment resulting from major accidents is not to be expected.  If they 
conclude that such an assumption may not be valid, they order the operator to 
complete the second procedure, which is a risk study.   
 Currently, 271 sites are required to perform a risk study which includes a 
description of accident scenarios and a risk analysis.  In some types of 
establishments, standardised criteria have been developed.  
The presentation offered the following lessons learned from the Swiss experience: 
• OMA has lead a number of small operators to decrease their inventory of 
hazardous substances so that they are no longer in the scope of OMA. 
• Operators of SMEs have trouble generating genuine worst case scenarios. 
• Damage to the environment is often more difficult to assess. 
• Operators of SMEs have trouble admitting that their activity could cause 
fatalities among the population. (Often they describe consequences in terms of 
“casualties” instead of fatalities). 
• Local authorities and SMEs still request a lot of guidance in implementation.   
Also, with SMEs, authorities are confronted by a much smaller amount of 
information.  Moreover, the “balance of power” between authority and operator 
changes with the size of the enterprise. Therefore, with SMEs, it is easier for 
authorities to make the operator adopt certain measures but it can also sometimes 
tempt the authorities to concentrate on the small sites instead of bigger sites with 
larger hazards.  
The presentation also commented that the overall experience was positive.  The 
broad scope of OMA has particular benefits, allowing a somewhat integrated 
perspective from authorities.  Ensuring that even small operators bear appropriate 
responsibility is also important. 
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 Perspective from Korea 
The Process Safety Management (PSM) legislation entered into force in 1996.  It 
covers 21 substances and the following industry sectors: 
• Oil refineries 
• Petrochemical industries 
• Organic composite material & synthetic resin manufacture 
• Fertilizer industries  
• Pesticide industries 
• Industrial explosives industry 
Out of 871 covered sites, it is calculated that 367 have less than 50 employees.  
Interestingly, the data seem to indicate that bigger companies are having more 
accidents than smaller ones in recent times.  
The PSM requirements are similar to the US PSM Rule.  It is performance-based 
legislation that includes assessment of a safety report, implementation of a 
process safety management programme (including SMS), and on-site inspection 
of the PSM programme by competent authorities.  
The Korean Occupational Safety and Health Administration (KOSHA) 
administers the programme.  It has created an appraisal system for prioritizing 
inspections and training on individual sites on the basis of performance with the 
PSM requirements as follows:    
• P = progressive – over 90%, self-implementation - no inspections during the 
year 
• S = stagnant – between 80-90%  - 1 inspection per year 
• M = mismanagement < 80% - 2 inspections per year and PSM training every 
6 months 
Korea shares the challenge of Seveso countries in that the PSM (safety) report can 
be a heavy burden for smaller sites.  Future improvements to the legislation may 
need to include simplification of the requirement for qualifying smaller sites.   
Results of the Seminar Group Sessions 
The participants were divided into four groups of approximately 20-30 
participants.  Groups 1 and 2 focused on whether modifications or additions to 
current Article 7 requirements would improve the ability of operators and 
authorities to meet Seveso objectives for lower tier sites.  Groups 3 and 4 were to 
discuss additional tools or guidance that could improve implementation. 
Group 1 
Group 1 identified a number challenges to lower site compliance and discussed 
the advantages and disadvantages of introducing specific requirements to address 
them.  These challenges included: 
• Lack of expertise and resources, especially SMEs 
• Difficulty of defining a proportionate approach to the MAPP (SMS) for small 
sites 
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 • Limited safety expertise available.  Often expertise is bought through outside 
consultants and not embedded into the company 
• Information necessary for land-use planning 
• Emergency planning for lower tier  
• Coherence of SMS vs. the MAPP (how should they be defined and 
distinguished from each other?) 
• Defining MAPPs that are proportionate to the risk or to the size.   
• Synergy between management systems, such as the Eco-Management and 
Audit System (EMAS)17 
The group also questioned whether it was adequate to define lower risk sites 
solely based on the presence of quantity of hazardous substances.   
In the discussion, some participants noted that consistency throughout the EU 
could be partly aided by better exchange of information among Member States, 
noting that the current Mutual Joint Visit Programme for Seveso Inspectors was 
already a very good tool.  It was also commented that the MAPP concept as a 
stand-alone obligation was not an adequate minimum requirement for lower tier 
sites.  Additional requirements should be required in proportion to the risk and 
taking into account extrinsic risk factors such as location of the site. 
Several participants also thought that the Annex II of the Directive (safety report 
elements) and Annex III (elements of safety management systems) were not clear 
in regard to expectations of lower tier sites and the principle of proportionality in 
general. 
Group 2 
Group 2 participants highlighted several advantages and disadvantages associated 
with implementation of Article 7.  Whether information required of lower tier 
sites was called a MAPP or SMS or safety report was not particularly important.  
The central objective was to drive operators to have effective risk management 
programmes.  Competent authorities need to have adequate information from 
operators to judge the effectiveness of their risk management programme and to 
fulfil their responsibilities to protect the population and environment.    
Two key questions concerned 1) how operators could implement the SMS with 
limited resources and 2) how authorities could enforce the SMS on lower tier sites 
with limited resources.  One participant noted that the key to effective 
implementation was to avoid resorting to bureaucratic approaches to obtain 
information for compliance assurance and enforcement.  For this reason, some 
participants thought that the SMS was a more appropriate instrument than safety 
reports for lower tier sites because it tends to promote a goal-setting approach.  
Moreover, some participants commented that every operator should perform a 
risk assessment.  I 
In many countries it appeared that there was not a big difference between 
requirements for upper vs. lower tier sites.  A risk-based approach to enforcement 
makes sense in this context but could also create a high burden for competent 
                                                 
17 A voluntary European initiative under which companies and other public organisations evaluate, 
manage and continuously improve their environmental performance.  The current version of the 
programme is defined by Regulation (EC) No 1221/2009 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 25 November 2009. 
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 authorities if too many sites were judged as high risk.  A risk-based approach also 
has to be carefully constructed so as to ensure consistency of treatment. 
It was noted that administration in a federal context (i.e. significant authority 
distributed to the local level) can be a challenge but does not have to provide 
additional complexity for covered sites.  Guidelines and checklists are helpful in 
harmonizing expectations at national level.   
Group 3 
A number of advantages and disadvantages of MAPP implementation were 
suggested by Group 3.  One advantage often cited was that for some prevention 
elements it makes sense to take the same approach to lower tier sites as upper tier 
sites, in particular, the SMS, external emergency plans and land-use planning.  
However, it can be a challenge to obtain all the information necessary from lower 
tier sites to execute these measures properly.   
Some participants in this group also raised concerns about the definition of a 
MAPP.  It was noted that Article 7 can be read in different ways.  It was 
recommended that a revised Directive be more clearly worded in this regard in 
order to promote consistency of interpretation and application across the EU.  It 
was specifically noted by some participants that this clarification would be better 
in the Directive than in guidance because legislative requirements are by and large 
the easiest to enforce.   
This group also noted that the Directive requires lower tier sites to take 
“appropriate measures” but does not specifically require lower tier sites to 
perform a risk assessment to determine what the appropriate measures could be.  
Many countries used the notification requirement to obtain more information on 
risk factors because they had no authority to require a risk assessment.   
It would be helpful to have EU guidance on lower tier site requirements to 
promote more coherent implementation across Europe.  However, such guidance 
would require a consensus among Member States on how to interpret the most 
important elements.  Currently, reaching such consensus could be difficult since 
some countries view the MAPP as a mini-safety report and others consider it to be 
more similar to an SMS.  More frequent exchange of good practice could lead to 
greater convergence among Member States around a common interpretation.   
Group 4 
Several participants in this group expressed concern about limitations associated 
with achieving Seveso objectives on lower tier sites.  Limited competency and 
resources available on lower tier sites mean that many SMEs often contract an 
external consultant to fulfill their obligations.  This solution does not necessarily 
lead to safer sites since operators may not have proper ownership of a risk 
management policy and implementation programme designed by parties external 
to the site. 
Many stakeholders representing both competent authorities and industry have 
raised legitimate concerns about consistency in applying Article 7 requirements 
across the Member States.  This situation was the down side of the flexibility of 
the Seveso approach.  Several participants felt that a minimum flexibility was 
necessary and appropriate and perhaps the lack of consistency could be reduced 
by indirect means, such as common training programmes for operators and 
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 inspectors, national or EU level technical working groups, national and 
multinational exchanges of good practice, such as the MJV programme and 
initiatives for joint inspections with Seveso inspectors from other countries.   
Particular challenges faced by competent authorities in regard to lower tier sites 
include having competent and sufficient staff to perform inspections, establishing 
a reliable appraisal system to prioritize inspection of lower tier sites, defining 
proportional approaches for smaller sites, and making the best use of the MAPP in 
enforcement.  Some participants also wondered if submitting the MAPP to the 
authorities should be mandatory. 
It was suggested that the availabiltiy of a simple and effective risk assessment tool, 
as applied to many cases in Switzerland, could be helpful for small sites and 
competent autorities alike.  It would help  both operators and authorities to 
understand the risk better without performing a full risk assessment. 
Conclusions from the Seminar 
The findings from the seminar largely reflected the findings of the survey and 
there was no evidence of any contradiction between the results of these two 
efforts.  In fact, the seminar confirmed many observations on advantages and 
disadvantages of Article 7 requirements noted by survey respondents.  Therefore, 
in summarizing seminar conclusions, only those findings are mentioned that offer 
additional insights. 
• Lower tier site status can remain a disproportionately heavy burden for 
small business but it is often difficult for authorities to find effective 
solutions to make the burden lighter.  To achieve objectives of the Seveso 
Directive, a minimum awareness and competence of risk management is 
necessary.  A minimum amount of information describing risk management 
on the site must also be available to authorities.  The level of effort must be 
commensurate with the risk and with the size of the site and may sometimes 
be disproportionately high in relation to the economic footprint of the site. 
• Additional complexity, and therefore, burden may be created for lower 
tier sites when more than one authority is closely involved in enforcement.  
This difficulty can be offset in part by continuous efforts to coordinate 
activities among the authorities and national uniform guidance. 
• Several participants noted the importance of having an adequate risk 
assessment from lower tier sites for emergency and land-use planning.  As 
a result some countries included risk assessment requirements in legislation or 
guidance.  Others, such as Italy, used the notification requirement to obtain 
more information on risk factors because they had no authority to require a 
risk assessment.  The demands on resources and expertise associated with risk 
assessment can make this task challenging for some lower tier sites.   
• Both Switzerland and Korea presented alternative practices and useful 
experience in regard to applying a proportionate approach to lower 
hazard sites.  The Swiss approach sought to balance the complexity of certain 
demands on small enterprises with higher risks in a number of ways, such as 
simplified risk assessment and uniform approaches for different sectors.  The 
Korean approach also presented an option for using residual risk estimates to 
prioritize the use of competent authority resources for enforcement on lower 
risk sites. 
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 • Participants acknowledged that there was a particular lack of coherence 
between the definition of the MAPP and the SMS.  In particular, countries 
evidenced substantial differences in regard to their interpretation of the MAPP.  
How sites could implement an SMS proportionate to site risks was not 
uniformly understood by many competent authorities.  
• There was a common desire among competent authority representatives 
to foster greater consistency in applying Article 7 requirements to lower 
tier sites across the EU.  There was no clear agreement  as to whether a 
direct approach (using legislation) or indirect approach (relying more on 
exchanges and joint initiatives) would be more practical and effective.  It was 
acknowledged that indirect approaches were more likely to preserve the 
flexibility of the current requirements. 
 
Recommendations Resulting from the European Commission Study 
Although several countries and workshop participants made recommendations on 
how implementation of Article 7 could be improved, no consensus emerged on 
any specific recommendation.  The study itself confirmed that exchange of 
practices among Seveso implementing countries was a first step in providing a 
common understanding of certain provisions of the Directive.  The study also 
confirmed that flexibility and proportionality were important to achieving the 
objectives of the Directive in local contexts.  However, meeting these objectives 
is sometimes an impediment to consistency and clarity of the basic Seveso 
requirements.  Given these results, the European Commission undertook to fulfil a 
more general recommendation to examine the lower tier provisions of the current 
Directive in the review of the Directive  It would also review how the 
implementation could be improved, for example by facilitating indirect activities, 
such as mutual exchanges and joint development of technical guidance and tools, 
that could lead to greater clarity and consistency.  The findings and observations 
from the study and the seminar would be taken into account in this review process. 
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Annex 1:  Questionnaire on Implementation of Article 7 in Seveso Countries 
for Seveso CCA Country Focal Points 
 
Implementation and enforcement of Seveso obligations in lower tier sites has been 
signalled by many Seveso countries as a particular challenge for competent authorities.  
Questions are often raised in relation to implementation and enforcement of the Major 
Accident Prevention Policy (Art. 7) and as a related topic, minimum requirements for 
Safety Management Systems at these sites.   
  
Against this background, the Czech competent authorities in collaboration with the 
European Commission are hosting a Seminar on Major Accident Prevention in Lower Tier 
Seveso Establishments on 22 April 2009, one day prior to the twenty-first meeting of the 
CCA18 in Prague, Czech Republic.  The goals of the seminar are as follows: 
 
 with regard to the existing directive provide recommendations about a set of 
instruments to optimise compliance; 
 with regard to the planned review of the directive provide recommendations for the 
reviewers to improve the enforceability of the directive. 
 
In addition CCA members and observers are invited to volunteer for the seminar steering 
group (discussions to be managed by e-mail and teleconference) that will lead 
development and execution of the seminar programme.  All CCA countries are invited to 
make recommendations regarding potential speakers.  Industry and other interest group 
views are welcome. 
 
As the focal point for your country’s participation in the CCA, we are sending you this 
questionnaire in preparation for the seminar and kindly ask you to manage your country’s 
response to it.  We request that no more than one questionnaire be completed by each 
country.  
 
Responses will be analyzed and the overall findings will be presented at the seminar and 
also may be used as appropriate for input into future policy or implementation support 
activities at EU level.   
 
If you could please complete your questionnaires and return them  to Maureen Wood 
(maureen.wood@jrc.it) by 31 January 2009, we would be very grateful. Please contact 
Maureen Wood if you require any clarifications regarding any questions. 
 
 
To volunteer to assist with the seminar preparation or recommend a speaker presentation, 
please contact Pavel Forint (Pavel.Forint@mzp.cz), ,Tobias Biermann 
(tobias.biermann@ec.europa.eu) or Maureen Wood.   
                                                 
18 Committee of Competent Authorities for Implementation of the Seveso II Directive (established 
by 96/82/EC Art. 22) 
 Questionnaire on Implementation of Article 7  
Kindly provide your answers to the questions below.  Please feel free to use as much 
space as necessary to respond to open questions and explain your answers.   
 
Country Name: _______________________ 
Contact Name:  __________________  Tel: _________________  Email: 
_____________ 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
   
1. Industry profile of lower tier sites in your country.  How are lower tier sites 
distributed among industry sectors (e.g., noting only the most important 
sectors)? Feel free to use your own words to generally describe the situation or you 
may provide estimated numbers or percentages, NACE19 codes, etc. or other more 
specific information if it is available to you.   
 
 
 
2. Size and resource characteristics of your country’s lower tier sites.   
To the best of your knowledge, please respond to the following questions20:  
 
Question:  What proportion of your sites  would you consider 
… 
Your estimate 
a.  … are small or medium-sized enterprises?  
b.  … have < 10 employees?  
c.  … belong to multinational corporations?  
 
3. What, if any, industry sectors or establishment sizes pose particular 
challenges for oversight and enforcement of lower tier obligations?  (If these 
sectors are also present in upper tier sites with similar problems, you may wish to 
mention this.) 
 
 
 
4. How would you describe the risk level associated with lower tier sites in 
comparison to upper tier sites?  Potential risk? Residual risk (after safety 
measures have been taken into account)?  Please respond to the best of your 
ability. 
                                                 
19 European Classification of Economic Activities (Nomenclature européenne des 
activités économiques – NACE) 
http://circa.europa.eu/irc/dsis/nacecpacon/info/data/en/index.htm 
20 Since there is no other source of objective information on this important aspect of the lower tier 
site profiles, we have to rely on your expert opinions in this regard.  For this reason, we would be 
grateful for any rough estimates of the situation in your country that you could supply.  Answers 
such as “~25%”, “Around 10”, and even “a significant majority”, though imprecise, would still be 
helpful.   Any subsequent analysis that cites these numbers will qualify them clearly and precisely 
as rough estimates.  (Of  course, if you have exact numbers, please cite them and note that they 
are exact.) 
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5. What legal obligations does your country impose on lower-tier sites in 
association with Article 7 requirements?  Please check only one answer. 
 Only the MAPP is required (the minimum obligation of the Directive) 
 A safety report is required (there is no MAPP requirement.)  
 Other (please explain/describe.)  
 
Additional comments/explanation: 
6. In the table below, please describe the content and format of MAPP’s that are 
typically considered acceptable by the authorities?  Also, please note any 
situations that would be considered exceptions to the norm. 
Length.  How long is it usually 
(minimum, maximum)? Does the 
length vary depending on the size or 
complexity of the site?  
 
Typical table of contents (or main 
headers of sections). Other 
necessary details, annexes? 
     
 
 
Guidelines or tools your country 
provides for operators to develop 
the MAPP or for authorities to 
assess the MAPP.  If an electronic 
document or html link is available, 
kindly list or attach it. 
 
 
7. Functional role of the MAPP. 
a. How do you use Article 7 (or the equivalent legal requirement at national 
level) as a basis for enforcement actions? 
 
b. How does Article 7 help operators with establishing good management of 
site risks? 
 
 
8. Does your country have a specific legal requirement regarding safety 
management systems on lower tier sites?   Check only one answer. If the answer 
is “yes” or “other”, please explain the requirement as necessary for a precise 
understanding (as well as its advantages and disadvantages) in the additional 
comments section. 
 No.      
 Yes.  Written SMS description and/or documentation is required by authorities
  
 Other.  (Please explain). 
Additional comments/explanation:  
 
9. Please list here any guidelines or tools your country has published for SMS for 
lower tier sites, if any.  If an electronic document or html link is available, kindly list 
or attach it. 
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10. Please indicate how criteria for evaluating lower tier sites differ from criteria for 
evaluating upper tier sites for the safety report/MAPPs and for the SMS. 
 
Safety report/MAPP   Very Different    Slightly different     Almost the same    Other 
 
SMS  Very Different    Slightly different     Almost the same    Other 
Please explain your answers.   
 
 
11. Please provide any other comments about implementation of Article 7 and any 
suggestions for improving the effectiveness of legal obligations for lower-tier 
sites on Seveso sites in your country or in Europe as a whole. 
 
 
 
 
 Annex 2:  Guidance Available in EU and EEA/EFTA Countries for MAPP and SMS 
This list was mainly constructed from responses to questions 6c and 9 of the survey.  However, in a few instance, existing sources on the Seveso 
Inspections are also included for convenience.  
Respondent Guidance 
Austria No specific guidance exists but transposition into Austrian legislation includes some more details than the Directive text 
Belgium The inspection instrument “Metatechnical Evaluation System” (M.E.S.) is used for the systematic auditing of the organisational and managerial 
ability of the Seveso establishments and is applied to lower and upper tier sites. http://www.employment.belgium.be/seveso.aspx  
 This is based on the fact that both kind of establishments via article 7 and 9 are expected to: 
• conduct a prevention policy that ensures a high level of protection 
• guarantee the implementation of all suitable measures, systems, procedures and such like, which are necessary to ensure that the prevention 
policy is carried out in an effective manner. 
The inspection instrument describes in a first part the basic concept of M.E.S., including the view of the inspection authorities with respect to 
MAPP and SMS.  Although the M.E.S. has not been developed specifically for carrying out internal safety audits, companies can use it to do initial 
surveys to allow them to draw their own appropriate conclusions in order to improve the management system in the domain of major accident 
prevention. 
Czech 
Republic 
The following guidelines have been created for implementing MAPP/SMS:  
• Principles, aims and policy for major accident prevention; 
• Description of a safety management system; 
• Evaluation form for assessment. 
Denmark It may be common knowledge to the CCA members but with a fairly low number of establishments falling within the scope of the Seveso II 
Directive and as the general administrative structure in Denmark is very de-centralised, it is extremely difficult to set up general rules for the 
implementation of the Seveso Directive. 
Estonia Guidance for the development of the MAPP and SMS:  http://www.tja.ee/file.php?11397  
This guideline is principally a translation of the EU guidance.  
Finland For operators we have a guide indicating what the document should contain.  We don't have a specific tool for authorities. 
France No specific tool is provided. 
Hungary Announcements of the National Authority (National Disaster Management): http://www.katasztrofavedelem.hu/tartalom.php?id=90  
EU Guidelines:  
http://www.katasztrofavedelem.hu/tartalom.php?id=432  
Publications: http://www.katasztrofavedelem.hu/tartalom.php?id=387  
Guidelines and Assistance publications: 
http://www.katasztrofavedelem.hu/tartalom.php?id=388  
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 Laws of the Special Authority (Hungarian Trade and Licensing office): 
http://www.mkeh.gov.hu/muszaki/EU/Seveso2/jogszabalyok  
Guidelines by the Special Authority: 
http://www.mkeh.gov.hu/muszaki/EU/Seveso2/utmutato  
Stances by the Special Authority: 
http://www.mkeh.gov.hu/muszaki/EU/Seveso2/allasfoglalasok  
Studies by the Special Authority: 
http://www.mkeh.gov.hu/muszaki/EU/Seveso2/tanulmanyok  
Iceland Guidelines for industry on the website of Iceland’s Administration of Occupational Safety and Health (AOSH) 
http://www.vinnueftirlit.is/is/storslysavarnir_efna/ include: 
- General information and guidelines 
- Lower tier sites 
- Upper tier sites 
- Emergency plans 
 
Checklists for internal AOSH are also used for:  
- MAPP and SMS  
- Safety reports 
- Emergency plans 
Ireland The section of the guidance on assessment of the safety report is used as guidance to operators on the MAPP [create Seveso inspections 
website link]. 
Italy The main criteria for drawing up the MAPP and the SMS are expressed in the Ministerial decree of  09.08.2000.  Specific guidelines for the 
inspectors (issued with a Directorial Decree) are also provided to verify the completeness of the structure of the MAPP, the SMS and their 
elements.  A description of the MAPP/SMS requirements and a copy of the checklist can be found in the Seveso Inspections Library [link] on the 
Seveso Inspections website. 
Other documents with information pertaining to implementation of SMS requirements on lower tier sites 
 Ministerial decree of 09.08.2000; 
 Guide lines for the inspector - Directorial Decree  
 http://www.minambiente.it/moduli/output_immagine.php?id=2105  
 APAT report  RT23/2003  http://www.ispra.gov.it/site/it-
IT/APAT/Pubblicazioni/Manuali_e_linee_guida/Documento/manuali_lineeguida_2003_23.html  
Latvia Latvia had guidelines from 2002-2005 years according to the previous Republic of Latvia Cabinet Regulation No. 259 Adopted 19 June 2001 
based on Drective 96/82/EC (before the amendment  2003/105/EC) but these guidelines are no longer used.  
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 Lithuania Order No. V-131 (issued by the director of Civil Protection Department on 30/09/2004) „On the Validation of the Documents Corresponding to 
Requirements of the  Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents and Directive on the Control of Major Accident hazards 
Involving Dangerous Substances“. Indicates the recommendations to operators on preparing documents setting out Major Accident Prevention 
Policy, safety reports and recommendations on organizing inspections. 
http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter3/dokpaieska.showdoc_l?p_id=247519&p_query=&p_tr2=      
Luxembourg The descriptions in Seveso Annex II and III are used as guidance. 
Malta There are no national guidelines but operators normally follow the international guidelines. It is not practical to develop national guidelines given 
small number of sites. The competent authorities received training in MAPP assessment through Twinning projects. 
Netherlands The Dutch Government provides tools for operators as to develop the MAPP and for inspection authorities in order to assess the requirements for 
a MAPP;  Website: www.brzo99.nl  under Inspection / Control list / C4  
Norway A Norwegian guideline is part of the national Seveso legislation. There is no guideline for assessing the MAPP specifically for Seveso, only for 
assessing safety reports. However, there is a guideline for assessing Internal Control Systems, and this includes what is required for assessing 
the MAPP. 
Poland • Methodology for determination safe location of establishments that can cause major accidents, 
• Guidelines for carrying out inspections in upper and lower tier establishments, 
• Chemical rescue basis, 
•  “Emergency response guidebook”, 
•  “Major accident prevention” – guidebook for the safety management system inspections, 
• Guidance on Seveso II Directive implementation – Phare Project PL 0105.04.01 Major accident prevention in Poland: 
• Industrial major accident prevention, Central Institute for Labour Protection – National Research Institute 
(www.pip.gov.pl/html/pl/doc/07040053.pdf ), 
• Major accidents prevention service, Central Institute for Labour Protection – National Research Institute (www.ciop.pl/18382.html ), 
• Tools, computer programs for determination of the major accident hazards and its consequences, 
• Information on industrial major accidents, part III – Major accidents prevention program, available on: www.mazowsze.straz.pl  , 
• Handbook on safety report evaluation, 
• Major accident prevention – handbook, 
• Guidebook on risk assessment methods connected with dangerous process installations – Institute of Nuclear Energy, 
•  “Safe establishment” – handbook, 
• Guidebook Control of main industrial hazards, International Labor Organization. 
 
There are publications available on:  http://www.ichp.pl/pl/Inne/poradnik/5c7121c.htm  and http://manhaz.cyf.gov.pl/manhaz/ind_pl.php?f=home  .  
Portugal The EU “Guidelines on a Major Accident Prevention Policy and Safety Management System” have been translated into Portuguese 
Romania A guide for preparing the MAPP/SMS was developed in the twinning project RO/2002/IB/EN/02. 
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 Slovakia Guidance has been developed in Slovak.  In addition, the content and format of the MAPP are defined in legislation. 
Slovenia  Examples of MAPPs are available on the web page of the Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning (MESP) 
 Minimum (obligatory) content of the explanatory part of document* defined in special guideline – available on the web page of MESP. 
Documents are available in Slovene only.  The Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning has also adopted a MAPP for its work in the area 
of major accident hazards’ control. 
Spain In Catalonia a protocol on safety assessment includes checklist questions about the MAPP 
Sweden There is a national guidance for both operators and authorities. This is only available in Swedish. The EU “Safety Management System Guidance 
– Seveso II” is also available (in Swedish as well as English). Inspection authorities may also have information meetings for new operators. 
Checklists are sometimes sent out for the operators to help in their preparation of their programmes.  
Switzerland  In French the general guidance is the Manuel I, for MAPP, look for “rapport succinct"): 
http://www.bafu.admin.ch/stoerfallvorsorge/00231/00754/index.html?lang=fr   
 http://www.bafu.admin.ch/stoerfallvorsorge/00231/06380/index.html?lang=fr  
 
 In German, the general guidance is the Handbuch I (for MAPP, look for "Kurzbericht"): 
 http://www.bafu.admin.ch/stoerfallvorsorge/00231/index.html?lang=de  
 http://www.bafu.admin.ch/stoerfallvorsorge/00231/06380/index.html?lang=de  
  
 In Italian the general guidance is the Manuele I (for MAPP, look for "rapporto breve"):  
 http://www.bafu.admin.ch/dokumentation/03393/03526/index.html?lang=it  
United 
Kingdom 
Guidance to industry includes:  
 A Guide to the Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1999 (as amended) (L111 - ISBN 071766175X) 
 Major accident prevention policies for lower tier COMAH sites (Chemical sheet 3 )- http://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/chis3.pdf  
 There is also other guidance which covers specific topics or is aimed at specific sectors.  Examples include: Human Factors in the MAPP 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/humanfactors/comah/12mapp.pdf  
- COMAH application at surface treatment sites - http://www.hse.gov.uk/foi/internalops/fod/oc/600-699/655-7.htm  
 Guidance for the Competent Authority includes: 
- Chemical Industries/Specialised Industries Inspection manual - http://www.hse.gov.uk/foi/internalops/hid/manuals/pmenf05.pdf  
- The HID framework for major hazard legislation http://www.hse.gov.uk/comah/sram/s2-7.pdf  
- Safety report assessment manual – Major Accident Prevention Policy and Safety Management Systems Aspects – Chapter 11 (although 
this relates to top tier sites the principles are equally relevant to lower tier sites) - http://www.hse.gov.uk/comah/sram/s8-15.pdf  
 HSE is also working on Delivery Guide 2N COMAH Lower Tier Major Accident Prevention Policies, but this is not yet available to an external 
audience. 
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 Annex 3:  Guidance on Implementation of SMS on Lower Tier Sites 
Respondent Response 
Belgium The inspection tool “M.E.S”, but is a common tool and guideline for upper and lower tier sites (see answer to question 6a) 
Czech 
Republic 
The Ministry of Environment Guidelines “Principles, Aims and Policy of Major Accident Prevention and Description of Safety Management System” 
(www.mzp.cz  – Czech version only). 
Estonia http://www.rescue.ee/vvfiles/0/ots.rtf    This guideline is based on the guideline in MAHB homepage (http://mahbsrv.jrc.it/downloads-pdf/smsf.pdf. 
Additionally the guideline takes into consideration national acts and standards of international management systems that Estonia has implemented. 
Finland For operators there is a guide indicating what the document should contain (only in Finnish). 
Iceland Guidelines for Seveso companies are available here: http://www.vinnueftirlit.is/is/storslysavarnir_efna/  
Ireland See Q 6 response 
Italy  Ministerial decree of 09.08.2000; 
 Guide lines for the inspector - Directorial Decree  
 http://www.minambiente.it/moduli/output_immagine.php?id=2105  
 APAT report  RT23/2003 
 http://www.apat.gov.it/site/it-IT/APAT/Pubblicazioni/Manuali_e_linee_guida/Documento/manuali_lineeguida_2003_23.html 
 
Se also the answer to question 6, third item of the table 
Lithuania The director of Civil Protection Department issued the Order No. V-131 on 30/09/2004 „On the Validation of the Documents Corresponding to 
Requirements of the Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents and Directive on the Control of Major Accident hazards 
Involving Dangerous Substances“. It gives only common guidelines for SMS without any difference between lower and upper tier establishments.  
Netherlands No specific guidelines or tools are published for lower-tier Seveso sites only.  There are guidelines and tools which are published and applicable for 
both lower-tier and upper-tier establishments.  See www.brzo99.nl  
Norway The above-mentioned regulations on internal control. 
Poland There have not been published any specific guidelines or tools for SMS for lower tier sites in Poland. Nevertheless, the Polish authorities have 
translated and published several documents (guidelines, recommendations) published by Major Accident Hazards Bureau (MAHB) and OECD. This 
includes (among others): 
a.  “Inspection of main industrial hazards”- handbook carried out within the PIACT Project, 
b.  “Major accident prevention” - handbook concerned SMS inspection, 
c.  “Guiding Principles for Chemical Accident Prevention, Preparedness and Response” elaborated under the auspices of the Working Group on 
Chemical Accidents that manages the OECD Programme on Chemical Accidents. 
  
The following studies were carried out within the Phare Project 0105.04.01: Prevention on Major Accident, Seveso II in Poland 
(Europeaid/114864/D/SV/PL): 
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• An introduction and basic information concerning Seveso II Directive, 
• A set of guidelines helpful to implementation of the Seveso II Directive, including “Guidelines on a major accident prevention policy and safety 
management system, as required by Council Directive 96/82/EC (Seveso II)”. 
Romania The twinning project RO/2002/IB/EN/02 developed guidelines for the SMS. 
Sweden We recommend the guidelines for SMS for upper tier sites published by the European Commission in 1998. The document has been translated into 
Swedish. We also give some additional recommendations on our website www.seveso.se . This site is entirely in Swedish. 
Switzerland No guidelines published. Reference is made to OECD Guidance (general and for SMEs). 
United 
Kingdom 
Specific guidance on SMS for COMAH operators is incorporated in the MAPP guidance referred to in Q6 above.  Additionally, HSE has published 
generic guidance for directors, managers, health and safety professionals and employee representatives who want to improve health and safety in 
their organisations - Successful health and safety management (HSG 165 – ISBN 0717612767) (http://www.hsebooks.com)  
 Annex 4:  Agenda and Presentations from the April 2009 CCA Seminar  
Seminar on Major Accident Prevention  
in Lower Tier Seveso Establishments 
22 April 2009, Prague, Czech Republic 
 
 The goals of the seminar are as follows: 
 To provide an insight in lower tier obligations and to discuss experience 
with the spectrum of safety requirements applied in Member States 
 to provide recommendations on how to optimise compliance; 
 with regard to the planned review of the directive provide 
recommendations for the reviewers to improve the enforceability of the 
directive. 
 
Morning Session  
Chairperson:  Miloš Paleček, Occupational Safety Research Institute  
09.00 – 09.10 Welcome and Introduction, Pavel Forint, 
Czech Ministry of Environment 
Part I: Overview of Article 7 and Seveso Implementation in Lower Tier 
Sites  
09.10 – 09:20 Seminar Background and Objectives, Tobias 
Biermann, European Commission, DG-
Environment  
09:20 – 10.00 Results of the Survey on Implementation of 
Seveso in Lower Tier Sites, Maureen Heraty 
Wood,  
European Commission, JRC-MAHB 
10:00 – 10:20 Industry Perspective SEVESO IMPACTS - 
Article 7 - Lower Tier sites, Douglas Leech, 
FECC - European Association of Chemical 
Distributors/CBA Chemical Business 
Association 
10.20 – 11:00 Coffee Break 
Part II: Perspectives on Seveso Implementation in Lower Tier Sites  
11:00 – 11.20 Implementation of Lower Tier Site 
Requirements in the Czech Republic, 
Stanislav Malý,  Occupational Safety 
Research Institute, Czech Republic  
11.20 – 11:40 Implementation of Lower Tier Site 
Requirements in Italy, Paolo Ceci, Ministry of 
Environment, Italy 
Part III: Addressing Lower Threshold Sites in non-Seveso Countries 
11.40 – 12.00 Addressing Low Thresholds in 
Switzerland, Bernard Gay, Federal Office for 
Environment (FOEN), Switzerland  
12.00 – 12.20 Korean regulation on process safety 
management for small chemical companies, 
Hyuckmyun Kwon, Occupational Safety and 
Health Agency (KOSHA), Korea 
12:20 – 12:30 Summary of Morning Session (Chairman) 
12.30 – 14.00 Lunch 
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 Afternoon Session – Chairperson:  Pavel Danihelka, Technical University 
of Ostrava 
 
Part IV: Tabletop Discussions  
Groups of 10-20 participants each will be established. Each group will 
discuss questions/reports on key points/recommendations. Subjects will 
be separated into policy/regulatory issues and implementation 
discussions. 
 
14:00 – 14:10 Introduction, Group Assignments 
14:10 – 15:20 Table discussion and recommendations  
15:20 – 15 :50 Coffee Break 
15:50 – 16:50 Each Table Rapporteur reports on key points/  
16:50 – 17 :20  General Discussion 
17:20 – 17:30 Summary, Tobias Biermann, European 
Commission, DG-Environment 
17 :30 Adjourn 
 61
  62
PRESENTATIONS WILL BE ATTACHED TO THE FINAL 
PUBLICATION 
European Commission
EUR 24836 EN – Joint Research Centre – Institute for the Protection and Security of the Citizen
Seveso Lower Tier Establishments: 
Implementation of Article 7 of the Seveso II Directive in the European Union
Maureen Wood
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union
2011 – 76 pp. – 21  x  29.7 cm
EUR – Scientific and Technical Research series – ISSN 1018-5593 (print), ISNN 1831-9424 (online)
ISBN 978-92-79-20402-9 (print)
ISBN 978-92-79-20403-6 (pdf)
doi:10.2788/26158
Abstract
The European Union hosts approximately 8500 industrial sites that are considered major hazards due to the 
potential accident risk associated with the presence of dangerous substances as defined by the Seveso II 
Directive. Approximately, half of these sites are classified as so-called lower tier sites because the quantity of 
the dangerous substances exceeds the lower threshold quantity stipulated in the Directive. Theoretically, the 
Seveso II Directive imposes a lower regulatory burden on lower tier sites than upper tier sites, whose quantity 
of dangerous substances exceed the higher threshold quantity given in the Directive. This lower burden is 
manifested particularly in Article 7, designed to apply exclusively to lower tier sites. In 2008-2009, on behalf of 
the Committee of Seveso Competent Authorities (CCA), the regulatory committee established by the Directive, 
the European Commission¿s Joint Research Centre (JRC) undertook a study of Seveso implementation in 
lower tier sites, through administration of a survey of competent authorities and subsequently co-organization 
of a workshop on the topic with DG-Environment and the Czech Republic. This paper summarizes the results 
of this study.   
How to obtain EU publications
Our priced publications are available from EU Bookshop (http://bookshop.europa.eu), where you can place 
an order with the sales agent of your choice.
The Publications Office has a worldwide network of sales agents. You can obtain their contact details by 
sending a fax to (352) 29 29-42758.
The mission of the JRC is to provide customer-driven scientific and technical support for the concep-
tion, development, implementation and monitoring of EU policies. As a service of the European Com-
mission, the JRC functions as a reference centre of science and technology for the Union. Close to the 
policy-making process, it serves the common interest of the Member States, while being independent 
of special interests, whether private or national.
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